1932 was proving to be a year of great instability, uncertainty and turmoil. For the end-July elections, the main slogans coined by Goebbels were “Germany awaken! Give Adolf Hitler Power!” And “Down with the System, its parties and its exponents!” In his speeches Hitler would condemn the Weimar “system” for the general economic and political decay and promise to get rid of “the nepotism of parties”. As he thundered in one of his last pre-election speeches, he will “sweep the thirty different political parties out of Germany”. The hint of a single-party dictatorship was clear enough. But the Nazis,  Hitler proclaimed, were interested in “the future of the German people,” not in parliamentary seats or ministerial positions. The NSDAP did not present itself as a party representing narrow interests or classes of people: instead as a “party of the German people”. However, this time around he avoided shrill anti-Semitism, presumably in an attempt to gather some votes from the liberal middle classes also. (Much like our own Hitler, who at times tries his hand mobilising Muslim votes too!)

The results were impressive. With 37.3 percent of the votes cast (19 percent more than what it got in the last Reichstag elections of 14 September, 1930) and 230 seats, the NSDAP formed the largest parliamentary group. Yet it was quite clear that the 50 percent plus vote needed for government formation would remain a far cry. A round of negotiations on forming a coalition government failed because Hitler doggedly insisted on the post of chancellor for himself, while the Reich president, though eager to rope in the NSDAP, considered Hitler too risky as chancellor. Therefore no new government was formed. Hindenburg asked Papen to head an unelected “presidential cabinet” as chancellor.

With the stalemate lingering on, the stormtroopers’ patience was running out. Belying Hitler’s assurance that they would not take a single step from the path of legality, in August the SA engaged in a whole series of politically motivated acts of violence directed primarily against members of the KPD, trade union buildings, left-wing newspapers and also the Reich Banner and Jewish locations. Particularly ghastly was the murder of a mine worker and KPD activist in Potempa, who was dragged out of bed at night by a gang of uniformed SA men and killed in front of his mother and brother. Hitler openly came out in defence of the murderers, letting slip his mask of peace and legality.

The rightist parties, hungry for power, chose to see the killings and rioting as the work of fringe elements (as if the SA did not belong to the Nazi Family!) and to pursue the goal of a grand rightist coalition. But there was hardly any progress to that end. Papen had come no closer to his goal of tying the National Socialists to the government, just as Hitler had made no progress towards securing the chancellor’s post — his cherished launching pad for erecting a dictatorship. In a situation where no party or coalition had the numbers, the only proper course would have been to seek the people’s verdict again, but that was indefinitely postponed by the Hindenburg-Papen government on the ground that an “emergency of state” required extraordinary measures. The Reichstag met for the first time after the July elections on 12 September 1932.

Before the proceedings started, KPD deputy Ernst Torgler seized the floor, demanding an immediate vote on the motions brought by his party, which included rejecting emergency governmental measures and a declaration of no confidence in the Papen government. To the surprise of all, Nazis supported the communist move. Hitler’s intent was to demonstrate, for all to see, how little parliamentary support the Papen government enjoyed. The SDP and the Centre Party also voted for the move and it was passed with a very big margin. Papen was compelled to dissolve the parliament. New elections were announced for 6 November.

Setback, Dejection and Division

The Nazi campaign for what would turn out to be the last free election in Germany before the end of World War II saw a peculiar combination of two thrust points. On one hand, taking a sharp U-turn from the July campaign, Hitler fully indulged in anti-Semite hate speeches and tried to combine this with his diatribe against the incumbent government, making the false allegation that Papen’s economic program was drafted by the Jewish banker Jacob Goldsmith and served Jewish interests. On the other hand, Nazi propaganda this time contained an unusually distinct anti-capitalist tone (as Goebbels wrote in his diary, “right now the most radical socialism has to be advanced”) presumably because the Great Depression was already taking its toll and generating anti-capitalist feelings among the working people and the middle classes. Goebbels indeed walked the talk when, as the party leader in charge of Berlin, he ensured that the NSDAP supported a strike by the city’s public transport workers a few days before the election. Together with the communist -led Revolutionary Union Opposition (RGO), the Nazi Factory Cell Organisation (NSBO) formed picket lines and brought traffic in Berlin to a grinding halt.

The Nazis thus used all instruments in their kit to attract different classes and strata, but the result was even more disappointing than the July verdict. In the November elections, they lost 2 million voters, their share of the vote declined by 4.2 per cent to 33.1 per cent and they won 196 parliamentary seats, down from 230 four months earlier. Along with the DNVP, the big winners of the election were the KPD, who increased their share of the vote from 14.5 to 16.9 per cent and took 100 seats in the Reichstag. With the SPD mopping up 21.58 percent of the vote, the combined share of the two left parties far surpassed the Nazis’. In terms of seats also, SPD got 133 and KPD 100, i.e., a total of 233 compared to NSDAP’s 196 in a 584 seat Parliament. But the left parties did not come together to try and utilise this historic opportunity, which would never again come their way.

After the November setback, the 4 December 1932 election in Thuringia came as another shock. Some forty percent of votes were lost compared to July and this was seen as a personal failure of Hitler, because he had personally led the campaign. The repeated failures led many political observers in Germany and abroad to conclude that Hitler’s obstinacy in demanding complete power had caused him to miss the bus. Harold Laski, the British political scientist and Labour politician, remarked that Hitler would likely end up as an old man in a Bavarian village.

Not a few party insiders were thinking along similar lines. For the first time, Party members declined: from 455,000 in August to 435,000 in October 1932 and so on. From around the country came reports of a “downcast” mood and a “tendency to complain.” Within the top leadership, a political debate was launched by Gregor Strasser, the ideologue who in 1925 played the principal role (with support from Goebbels) in trying to bolster the socialist strain vis-a-vis the nationalist one in the party program. (See box)

The Strasser Rebellion

After the election defeat in November, Gregor Strasser expressed the opinion that the party should move from opposition into government without insisting on the chancellor’s office as a categorical precondition. He spelled that out to Hitler in no uncertain terms. Hitler interpreted this as a challenge to his authority and reacted with commensurate venom. According to Goebbels, he wanted to strip Strasser of power, but that was far from easy. Being the Reich organisational director, Strasser enjoyed great respect with the party rank and file; he was also considered by German industrialists as one of the few National Socialists with whom one could do business.

On the eve of the first session of Reichstag, Hitler ordered NSDAP deputies to take a hard line, arguing that “Never has a great movement been victorious if it went down the path of compromise.” Strasser on his part summoned the NSDAP state inspectors and argued that Hitler had not been following a “clear line” since August 1932 other than “wanting to become chancellor at all costs.” Since there was no realistic chance of that happening, Hitler was risking the disintegration and decay of the movement. There were two ways to achieve power, Strasser argued. The legal one—in which case Hitler should have accepted the position of vice-chancellor and tried to use it as a political lever. And the illegal option—which would have entailed trying to seize power violently through the SS and SA. He would have followed his Führer down either path, Strasser said, but he was no longer prepared to wait indefinitely. So he was leaving the party, he told the distressed audience.

After receiving the information of this meeting, Hitler met the state inspectors in his hotel suite to refute the arguments put forward by Strasser. Becoming vice-chancellor, he said, would have quickly led to fundamental differences with Papen, who would have dismissed any initiative on his (Hitler’s) part and thus shown that Hitler was incapable of governing. “I refuse to go down this road and still wait until I’m offered the chancellorship,” Hitler said. “The day will come, and probably sooner than we think.” Even less promising was the illegal path to power, he pointed out, since Hindenburg and Papen would not hesitate to issue orders for the army to shoot. Mustering all his powers of persuasion and melodrama, Hitler succeeded in securing the loyalty of the state inspectors.

Behind the scenes, another plot was being worked out. Aware of Strasser’s position, General Schleicher, former defence minister under Papen and currently Reich chancellor, briefly tried to rope in the moderate forces in NSDAP under Strasser for government formation. He introduced Strasser to Hindenburg, and the latter said he was amenable to the idea. But Strasser failed to mobilise any support from his colleagues. Schleicher’s game plan failed.
Hitler came to know of Strasser’s secret meeting with Hindenburg and saw his fears of a conspiracy confirmed. Finding himself in a very tight corner, Strasser resigned from all his party positions, gave up his Reichstag mandate and promised to keep away from political activism for two years. He was completely isolated. On 30 June 1934 (“the Night of the Long Knives”) to be precise, Hitler would have  Strasser shot dead.

Suddenly, Hitler is Chancellor of Germany

The Strasser episode gave the NSDAP another rude shock. The party seemed to be going into free fall from the zenith of its career. But Hitler stuck to his guns. He was “utterly decided”, he said, “not to sell the first-born child of our movement for the pittance of being allowed to participate, without power, in a government” The question of ‘what next’ remained unresolved. The year 1933 opened in utter confusion.

But suddenly, the NSDAP saw light at the end of the tunnel. On 30 January 1933, Hitler became the chancellor of the most powerful state in central Europe at a relatively young age of 43. The KPD called for a general strike and urged the SPD and all trade unions to join a common front of resistance against fascism. The social democrats, rather than joining the strike, asked its members to continue the battle within constitutional parameters, and to steer clear of “undisciplined behavior”. Echoing this defensive attitude, the General German Trade Union Association chairman, Theodor Leipart, stated on 31 January, “Organisation and not demonstration is the watchword of the hour”. No significant resistance, not to speak of a general strike, could be organized by a pathetically divided Left.

But how did the great breakthrough come to materialise? It was actually a product of sinister intrigues behind the scenes in which a handful of figures, most notably DNVP leader Alfred Hugenberg, former Chancellor von Papen and the incumbent chancellor Schleicher, pulled the strings.[1] Papen, eager to play the kingmaker and thus wield real power himself, met and urged Hitler to bury the hatchet and seal a deal with him for getting into Schleicher’s shoes. For his part, Hitler reckoned that an understanding with Papen offered a chance of getting out of the stalemate and reaching his cherished goal. He knew that the ex-chancellor retained privileged access to the president and could help break down Hindenburg’s resistance to the idea of Hitler becoming chancellor. So he did not hesitate to take a chance.

And the secret plan did click. Under attack from various quarters for various reasons, very soon Schleicher lost Hindenburg’s confidence and with continuous prodding by Papen, the president dismissed him, asking his trusted ex-chancellor to find ways of forming a new government. Papen, after much effort, finally overcame Hindenburg’s resistance to the idea of Hitler as chancellor—on the condition that the NSDAP leader formed his government “within the framework of the constitution and with the assent of the Reichstag.” Papen and Hitler now lost no time in finalizing their deal. It was agreed that the NSDAP would get the post of chancellor and just two ministerial positions, with Papen as vice chancellor.

On the face of it, this was a great concession from the Nazi side, who had to contend themselves with only two posts in an eleven-member cabinet. With an overwhelming majority, Hitler’s conservative partners believed, they would be able to use Hitler as a tool. When an acquaintance warned Papen about Hitler’s thirst for power, he replied: “You’re wrong. We engaged him for our ends.” Many others including foreign observers also thought that Papen and Hugenberg as Minister of Economy would hold the real power in the cabinet with the support of Hindenburg, whose closeness with Papen and distaste for Hitler was well-known.

How Hitler made it to the Chancellor's Chair

“The September 1930 electoral result immediately created a hitherto unprecedented situation. Both the leaders of the bourgeois parties and important ‘captains of the economy’ were suddenly confronted with a party that had mushroomed from an 800,000 voter organisation to a six million one, thus turning the NSDAP into a powerful political force and the second most powerful party. The NSDAP had thus become a force that could no longer be overlooked, but equally as important, a power that opened up quite new, surprising, and welcome possibilities for overcoming the parliamentary obstacles for the ‘legal’ transition to a dictatorial form of domination.

… However, its possible role and the leadership under which this was to happen became a matter of contention…. To simplify matters the following four major groups and strategies can be observed:

1. Alfred Hugenberg and his party [DNVP] as well as the circles from heavy industry and the landed aristocracy behind his party, relying on Reich president Paul Von Hindenburg, resolutely pressed for an alliance with the NSDAP, with the NSDAP as a junior partner, attracting the masses – in other words, an alliance that would assure the Hugenberg party of supremacy in the bourgeois camp and leadership in the desired ‘National Dictatorship’, the culmination of which should in due course be the restoration of the monarchy.

2. The Centre party (Bruning) and those circles in heavy industry, chemicals, the electrical industry, the export sector, and the bankers behind it, wanted to win over the NSDAP for a government alliance. With the assistance of the NSDAP it thereby hoped to move from the Weimer democracy to and authoritarian regime that in the long run would similarly culminate in the restoration of the monarchy.

3. In contrast to these strategies, Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz Thyssen – both principal spokesmen of a group of industrialists and bankers particularly strongly linked to the US finance capital – were not anxious to subordinate the Hitler party to one of the old bourgeois parties. Instead, using Herrmann Goring, whom they backed very generously as their go-between to the NSDAP, they pressed Adolf Hitler to stake a claim to the chancellorship as a precondition for the NSDAP’s joining the government. [Gossweiler adds after two pages, “Both Schacht and Thyssen ... feared that Hitler, given the signs of decline in his party, might be influenceable and agree to a compromise solution as suggested, for example, by Schleicher and Strasser. Therefore, [they] did everything possible to periodically prop up Hitler’s confidence in the final, successful outcome.”]

4. General Kurt Von Schleicher cooperated with the NSDAP organization head Gregor Strasser, until his demise in December 1932, in attempting to set up a military dictatorship.

-- Kurt Gossweiler, ibid, pp 132-33

But very soon such naïve hopes fell flat. It was not a government formed by a proper coalition of parties but a presidentially appointed cabinet in which the ‘majority’ (barring Papen and Hugenberg) was actually a motley collection of men without any party affiliation and political experience. Secondly, the other members of the cabinet were no match for Hitler’s tactical cleverness and his notorious mendacity. Within weeks, he succeeded in securing the sort of favour with Hindenburg that Papen had formerly claimed for himself and had their backs against the wall. With Wilhelm Frick as the minister of the interior and Hermann Goering initially as minister without portfolio (many more would be added to the cabinet as time passed) the Nazi triumvirate now set out to replicate the experience of the Thuringia laboratory on a grand national scale.

30 January: Manipulating the Cabinet

Hitler was sworn in on 30 January 1933, and in five hours he was conducting the first, privately held, cabinet meeting. The cabinet did not command an absolute majority in the Reichstag, and a solution had to be found. Hugenberg suggested banning the KPD and redistributing their parliamentary seats, which would yield a parliamentary majority. Hitler was a more intelligent politician; he did not wish to start his rule with such a draconian move. Banning the Communist Party would cause domestic unrest and perhaps lead to a general strike, he told the cabinet. He added: “It is nothing short of impossible to ban the 6 million people who stand behind the KPD. But perhaps in the coming election after the dissolution of the Reichstag, we (meaning the cabinet as a whole) can win a majority for the current government.” To allay the apprehensions of his conservative coalition partners, he promised that even if his party fared extremely well relative to the others, the composition of the cabinet wouldn’t change. Then it was Papen—and not Hitler—who made a radical suggestion. It should be made clear, the vice-chancellor declared, that the next election would be the last one and that a return to the parliamentary system would be ruled out “for ever.” Hitler gladly endorsed this proposal, saying that the upcoming Reichstag election would indeed be the final one and that a return to parliamentary democracy was “to be avoided at all costs.” With the whole pack of reactionary power-grabbers having a negative consensus on questions of democracy, communism and the people’s right to elect their representatives, the first meeting thus ended on a happy note.

1 February: Messages to the People

A Presidential decree dated 1 February 1933 announced new elections on 5 March 1933. The real motives were suppressed and the decision was justified as giving the German people the opportunity to “have their say on the formation of a new government of national solidarity.” “Now it will be easy,” Goebbels wrote in his diary on 3 February, “… for we can call on all the resources of the State. Radio and press are at our disposal. We shall stage a masterpiece of propaganda. And this time, naturally, there is no lack of money.”

The same day the nation heard the chancellor’s man ki baat for the first time on public broadcast. He combined his customary attacks on the democratic “betrayal” of November 1918 and the Weimar Republic (such as “fourteen years of Marxism have brought Germany to the brink of ruin”) with appeals to conservative, Christian, nationalist values and traditions. The first task of his government, Hitler said, was to overcome class hostilities and restore “the unity of our people in spirit and will.” Christianity, Hitler added, was to be “the basis of our morals,” the family the “basic cell of our body as a people and a state,” and respect for “our great past” the foundation for the education of Germany’s young people (replace ‘Christianity’ with ‘Hinduism’, and you are easily transported  from Nazi Germany to RSS India!). On foreign policy he said a Germany that had recovered its equality with other states would stand for “the preservation and solidification of peace, which the world needs now more than ever.” He also announced a “massive, blanket attack on unemployment” that would overcome the problem “once and for all” within four years. Hitler ended his speech with the same appeal he was to utter innumerable times in the future: “Now, German people, give us the span of four years and then you may pass judgement upon us!”

All such fine words of peace and democracy were, however, contradicted by another presidential decree issued on 4 February 1933 -- the Decree for the Protection of the German People -- which allowed the government to curtail the right to free speech and free assembly and subjected the SPD and the KPD to stringent restrictions.

3 February: Getting the Generals on Board

In his introductory visit to the commanders of the German army and navy, Hitler defined his government’s first goal as to “reclaim political power,” which would have to be the “purpose of the entire state leadership.” Domestically there would have to be a “complete reversal” of present conditions. Pacifist tendencies would no longer be tolerated. “Anyone who refuses to convert has to be forced,” Hitler declared, and Germany’s youth and the entire population had to be aligned with  the idea that “only battle can save us and everything else must be subordinated to this thought.” The “sternest, authoritarian state leadership” and “the removal of the cancerous damage of democracy” were necessary to strengthen Germany’s “will to defend itself.” As regards foreign policy, Hitler said his first goal would be “to fight against Versailles” by achieving military equality and rearming the Wehrmacht. “Universal conscription has to be reintroduced,” Hitler demanded. He also dropped clear hints about his preferred foreign policy direction once Germany had regained its status as a major military power — “conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanification.”

brecht_0The World’s One Hope

The compassion of
the oppressed for
the oppressed is
indispensable.
It is the world’s one hope.

- Bertolt Brecht

The generals could easily identify with a battle against Marxism and pacifism, demands for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, a rearming of Germany’s military and the restoration of its status as world power. They were especially pleased to hear Hitler promise that the Wehrmacht would remain the country’s only legitimate military force and that it would not be used to put down domestic opponents. The latter, Hitler declared, was the job of National Socialist organisations, particularly the SA.

The early bonding between the Fuhrer and the military leadership reassured and benefited both sides. The chancellor could now concentrate on crushing the political Left and bringing German society as a whole into line with Nazi ideals without any fears of military intervention. Moreover, unflinching army support would really stand him in good stead at all critical junctures in his political career, including the war years from the late 1930s. The military leadership in turn had received a guarantee for its monopoly position and was assured that its concerns would enjoy the highest priority within the new government.

20 February: Cozying Up with Business Magnates

Though support from big business was growing over the years, some of the biggest corporations were somewhat hesitant. So on 20 February 1933 a meeting was arranged with 27 top industrialists and bankers including Krupp von Bohlen, the president of the Reich Association of German Industry, who had become an enthusiastic Nazi overnight, Bosch and Schnitzler of I. G. Farben, and Voegler, head of the United Steel Works. Hitler and Goering clearly spelt out the government’s attitude to industry. The former once again reaffirmed his belief in private property, denied rumours that he was planning any wild economic experiments and stressed that “only the NSDAP offers salvation from the Communist danger.” He promised that he would restore the Wehrmacht (the unified armed forces) industry, which was of special interest to such industrial concerns as Krupp, United Steel and I. G. Farben, which stood to gain the most from rearmament.  At the end, Hitler declared, “Now we stand before the last election,” and promised that “regardless of the outcome, there will be no retreat.” If he did not win the majority, he would stay in power “by other means . . . with other weapons.” The leaders of the business world were visibly impressed with everything Hitler said, and said so candidly.

Goering, talking more to the immediate point, stressed the necessity of “financial sacrifices” which “surely would be much easier for industry to bear if it realized that the election of March fifth will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.” After both leaders left the hall, the host passed the hat and collected no less than three million marks.

Having effectively denied their main opponents SPD and KPD a level playing field in the forthcoming elections through the decree of 4 February 1933, NSDAP leaders believed an early election would give them an absolute majority that would allow them to jettison the coalition and make a smooth transition from the ramshackle parliamentary democracy to naked one-party dictatorship.  To ensure this, and to leave nothing to chance, they took recourse to all sorts of administrative shake-ups, underhand means and repressive measures on concocted charges. And once again they had the full support of the pack of reactionaries in the Cabinet and of the Monarchist president, none of whom realised that by undermining the parliamentary system, they were actually digging their own graves.

February: Nazification of German Radio and the Police Force

While Goebbels had been busy overseeing a comprehensive change in personnel in German Radio, the most important medium of political and ideological indoctrination, Goering in his capacity as acting Prussian interior minister had already begun to “cleanse” the Prussian police and administration of the few remaining democrats. Prussian police departments were instructed to “support the national propaganda with all their might, combat the activities of organisations hostile to the state with the most severe means and, if necessary, to have no qualms about using firearms.” To be perfectly clear, Goering added: “Police officers who use their weapons in the performance of their duties will be covered by me regardless of the consequences. Conversely, those who hesitate to do their duty will suffer disciplinary action.” This “fire-at-will decree” was in effect a license to kill anyone who dissented from  the official ideology.

On 22 February 1933, Goering also ordered the creation of an auxiliary police force consisting of members of the “national associations”— the paramilitaries the SS, the SA and the Stahlhelm—ostensibly for the purpose of combating “increasing unrest from radical left-wing and especially Communist quarters.”

Per instructions from above, the police did nothing to prevent the SA from terrorising people. Social Democrats were mistreated, but Communists got the worst of it. As early as the first week of February, it became practically impossible for the Left to assemble in public even in Berlin, till recently a stronghold. Almost without exception, Communist newspapers were banned.  During 1933-34, the political police was gradually centralised to form the Secret State Police (Gestapo).

Campaigning For the Last Election

On 10 February 1933 the National Socialists kicked off the campaign with a lavish event in Berlin’s Sportpalast, where Hitler was presented as “the leader of young Germany”. The chancellor repeated his attacks on the “political parties of disintegration,” promised to replace “lazy democracy” with “the virtue of personality and the creative power of the individual” – thus preparing the public mind for a transition to dictatorship -- and asked for “four years” to bring about the “renewal of the nation.” His speech was very well-received, not so much for the content but for the oratorical frenzy and emotional appeal of the concluding lines which, as almost always, sounded like a political echo of the Lord’s Prayer.

The Nazis carried on election propaganda such as Germany had never seen before. Under Goebbels’ expert direction, the NSDAP also sought to co-opt Hindenburg’s aura for their own propaganda. One of their campaign posters showed Hitler, the anonymous First World War soldier, and the former field marshal standing shoulder to shoulder. The caption read: “The marshal and the private fight with us for peace and equal treatment.” They also sought to exploit Hindenburg’s mythic status by playing up Papen’s connection to the Reich president. “If Hindenburg trusts him, so can Germany,” read one campaign poster featuring images of both men. “Vote for his close associate, Vice-Chancellor von Papen.” In addition to drawing votes for the cabinet, this line of propaganda aimed at keeping the two important political figures under the false impression that the Nazis were really sincere about the coalition.

Election
The sign says - Germans, Attention! This shop is owned by Jews. Jews damage the German economy and pay their German employees starvation wages.

Charlie Chaplin:

Excerpt From ‘The Great Dictator’ Speech

Soldiers! don’t give yourselves to brutes - men who despise you - enslave you - who regiment your lives - tell you what to do - what to think and what to feel! Who drill you - diet you - treat you like cattle, use you as cannon fodder. Don’t give yourselves to these unnatural men - machine men with machine minds and machine hearts! You are not machines! You are not cattle! You are men! You have the love of humanity in your hearts! You don’t hate! Only the unloved hate - the unloved and the unnatural! Soldiers! Don’t fight for slavery! Fight for liberty!

You, the people have the power - the power to create machines. The power to create happiness! You, the people, have the power to make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure.

Then - in the name of democracy - let us use that power - let us all unite. Let us fight for a new world - a decent world that will give men a chance to work - that will give youth a future and old age a security. By the promise of these things, brutes have risen to power. But they lie! They do not fulfil that promise. They never will!

Dictators free themselves but they enslave the people! Now let us fight to fulfil that promise! Let us fight to free the world - to do away with national barriers - to do away with greed, with hate and intolerance. Let us fight for a world of reason, a world where science and progress will lead to all men’s happiness. Soldiers! in the name of democracy, let us all unite!

Note:

1. For a brief but insightful account of the political developments and intrigues that eventually led to Hitler being chosen as chancellor, see box based on a paper written by Kurt Gossweiler, which we have taken from the aforementioned compendium Resistible Rise. Born in 1917, Gossweiler served in the German Army till 1943 and then defected to the Russian Army. At the end of the war he became a well-known scholar on fascism in the GDR.