The Formative Years Summed Up

The strategic perspective of the communist movement during the period under review was determined by the principal contradiction between the emerging Indian nation and British imperialism and two other major contradictions, viz., feudalism versus the broad masses, particularly landlords versus peasants; and British and Indian big bourgeoisie versus the Indian working class. The CPI operated on all three levels, but its failure (and the Congress’ success) in mobilising the peasantry, i.e., the bulk of the nation, pushed it to the sideline in the freedom movement, and for that matter in the country’s political life.

Let us elaborate. In the 1920s and 30s, the struggle against British imperialism with all its ramifications was a multi-class movement that was coming more and more under bourgeois hegemony, but was also amenable to proletarian or communist influence. Bourgeois hegemony sought to establish itself both through the Gandhian peasant' value-system and the Nehruvian socialist phraseology. And the communist movement arose as the proletarian challenge to that hegemony. In-between the two, various petty bourgeois trends like patriotic terrorism and spontaneous peasant/tribal uprisings also surfaced from time to time, but sooner or later they disintegrated as distinct trends and got merged with either of the two main streams or simply died down.

The forces of both bourgeois nationalism and communism had to recognise the multi-class character of the anti-imperialist struggle (hence the UF approach on the part of both) while striving to consolidate its own class position to the maximum possible extent (which gave rise to a constant contention). In this protracted game of unity and struggle, which determined the main ideological dimension of the national liberation struggle, each side utilised the other, but the overall initiative and domination belonged to the nationalist leadership. And this finally decided the character of incomplete independence India achieved in 1947.

In the course of some 25 years of unity and struggle within the freedom movement, both the two main forces made tactical errors and suffered setbacks. At times the nationalist leadership took steps that alienated the fighting masses, while at other junctures the CPI, over- zealous to attack bourgeois betrayals or (as in 1942) to mechanically uphold the internationalist duty, got isolated from the national mainstream. But overall, the Congress leadership — with Gandhi and the junior Nehru playing complimentary parts in it — succeeded in defeating the communists in a duel for people’s hearts and brains : while Gandhi's saintly appeals worked very effectively at the emotional plane, Nehru’s eloquent socialism often stole the wind from communists’ sails. The failure of early Indian communists is thus expressed most pointedly as a political defeat against the unique Gandhi-Nehru combination. Gandhi carried with him the peasantry, the most vital force of Indian society, and Nehru (at times aided by others like Subhas Rose) won the hearts of left-leaning youth — the harbingers of any revolutionary change. None of them could carve out any stable base among the working class (for the workers’ class instinct, born of their objective conditions of life and struggle, made them a difficult prey for Gandhi’s trusteeship concept or Nehru’s sentimental socialism), which therefore remained largely a communist constituency; but it was peasant support that decided the issue — as it did in China the opposite way. In China Mao personified the revolutionary proletarian leadership of the toiling peasants; in India history shaped his mirror image in the person of Gandhi, whose innate appeal to the peasant masses (and of course his charming reformism) prompted the bourgeoisie to prop him up as their leader — nay, the leader and father of the nation, the Mahatma. Here let it be noted in passing that without this class-backing of the bourgeoisie — which was conscious, calculating and organised —  and without the Britishers’ acceptance of him as the safest leader to negotiate with, Gandhi’s strategy of non-violent satyagraha and all that would never have succeeded; but that is another story.

Thus it was above ail the failure to forge a revolutionary alliance with the peasantry that incapacitated the Indian proletariat and its party to decide the course of India’s freedom struggle and emerge as its leader. The CPI generally recognised the decisive importance of agrarian revolution as the axis of the national liberation movement, but did not properly orientate itself or devise the concrete method, organisational form and style of work necessary for the purpose. Wherever the communists carried on a consistent work (as in Malabar in mid-1930s), the Gandhian influence proved to be quite superficial if not imaginary, but such occasions were regrettably few and far between.

If the communist party’s relation with the peasantry is one fundamental question of policy in colonial/semi-colonial countries, the other one is the relation with the bourgeoisie and its party, the INC. Here the Indian communists faced a much more complex situation than their Chinese counterparts. The Congress was originally more a movement than a party. At later stages, even as the Gandhian coterie was consolidating its grip on the top, in popular perception it remained a broad national platform necessarily open to all anti-imperialist forces — a perception that was in the interest of the bourgeoisie to preserve. Therefore, the much-accredited accommodating character of the Congress was rather in-built or inalienable and not a token of generosity on the part of Gandhi or Nehru. They did admit various revolutionary democratic forces into the Congress fold, but only to curb the militancy of, and politically absorb, the latter. In fact this explains the inverse relationship, noted by many authors, .between the consolidation of the Congress organisation on the one hand and growth of mass militancy and advancement of various radical political forces on the other. Historians of the liberal nationalist school always downplay this aspect and ignore the difficulties of Congress-CPI united front. They are all praise for the WPP model and much regretful for its discontinuation, precisely because this model was actually leading to political assimilation of the CPI in the Congress. Of course, we have our own criticism for the abrupt and total end of the WPP practice and for the isolationism that followed, but that is from an entirely different perspective as discussed elsewhere. The post-1935 UF line was more balanced and mature and ensured the Party’s emergence from obscurity to a distinct political identity.

As regards developing a theory of Indian revolution or Indianisation of Marxism-Leninism, the CPI's record has been decidedly poor. In neighbouring China, Mao from the beginning firmly emphasised and worked strenuously for the integration of Marxism-Leninism with peculiar Chinese conditions, and this tacitly implied the possibility of denial of Comintern instructions if necessary. By contrast, the CPI leadership lacked this creativity, this courage of conviction, and always looked up to the Comintern for deciding the course of action in India. This over-dependence or uncritical acceptance of international ‘suggestions’[1], which would prove so fatal in 1942, was both a cause and an effect of the non-emergence of an authoritative Party leadership in course of leading class struggle and two-line-struggle,

The problems of top leadership — including that of factionalism — naturally percolated to lower levels. Scant attention was paid to strengthening the party through a system of ideological education, practical-political training and organisational campaigns, check-ups, regularisation of membership etc. In other words, Party building was never taken up as a task so important by itself.

To what extent were the immaturities and shortcomings of the formative years of the communist movement overcome in the next period ? How did the bright traditions, such as working tirelessly for the cause of national liberation and social emancipation in the face of severe repression and relying completely on the support of the poorest classes of society[2], reach fruition in the shape of concrete achievements ? These questions bring us to a study of the next stage of the movement — one of wholesome growth, despite mistakes and setbacks, in the context of India’s transition from colonialism to neocolonialism — to be covered in Volume II (September 1939-1952).

Notes:

1. There was a short-lived exception when the Indian communists resisted the CI pressure for immediately disbanding the WPP; but in this case too, they seem to have drawn strength from the support of CPGB and MN Roy for continuing the same. In fact the distortion in the CI-CPI relationship was at times ag gravated by conflicting pieces of advice from abroad.

2. Russian funding was a rare occurence and that too mainly during the first half of the 1920s. Communist activists and leaders had to meet personal expenses, run the Party organisation and Party papers, fight court cases etc. with great financial difficulties and diseases like TB, resulting from mal-nutrition, was quite common among them.