[From the appendix to the Political-Organisational Report of the Sixth Party Congress.]

This roving army of professional killers enjoyed overwhelming support from the Bhumihar caste of Bhojpur, from its castemen spread throughout Bihar and even from parts of Uttar Pradesh. Powerful government officials and politicians, cutting across party lines, helped it. It also drew a degree of support from the Rajputs of Bhojpur. Initially it was floated on the pretext of raising agrarian demands of kulaks, mainly on Congress’ initiative. But soon the leadership passed into the hands of BJP and it acquired the character of an armed outfit with the declared aim of liquidating Maley from Bhojpur. JD leaders were also hobnobbing with it, in its formative stages at least, and it took special care to build equations with Yadav kulaks against us. This political united front against us was manifest in 1996 parliamentary elections when the BJP-supported Samata candidate, and Congress as well as JD candidates, all competed with each other in garnering the support of Ranvir Sena. The JD MP, after victory, demanded the lifting of ban on it. It was visible again when they jointly launched a protest movement against the transfer of the DM and SP after the Bathani Tola massacre. CPI-CPI(M) played a very dubious role by conducting sustained propaganda that Maley’s exaggeration of the contradiction between labourers and farmers, its casteist politics and adventurist actions are to be primarily blamed for the rise of Ranvir Sena.

The Ranvir Sena’s propaganda theme against the Party adopted a clear BJP tenor when it accused Maley of being agents of foreign powers viz. China and Pakistan which is out to destroy the social fabric of Indian society, i.e. the caste-based social hierarchy, and vowed to eliminate red flag not only from Bhojpur but from the face of India. Its symbol too was saffron.

A positional war stretching for months went on in Belaur against invading gangs of armed landlords. The mood remained upbeat and a powerful demonstration in Ara rent the air with the cries of ‘Bihta and Ekwari have been smashed and now it is the turn of Belaur’.

In retrospect, many comrades feel that instead of just defending ourselves, had we gone on an all-out offensive to liquidate the armed gangs of Belaur, perhaps the Ranvir Sena could have been nipped in the bud. It is true that at that juncture however, we could not grasp the full implication of this phenomenon and saw the struggle at Belaur as a local phenomenon confined to the village. Caste mobilisation, however, was spreading quite fast and soon clashes began in many Sandesh villages and landlords in hitherto dormant Sahar villages too started exhibiting activism. They began killing all and sundry, while people’s forces confined themselves to selective targets.

Then came the 1995 elections and we won both Sahar and Sandesh seats, thereby for the first time challenging the political hegemony of landlords and kulaks. Though these two block have historically been our best strongholds in Bhojpur, we had failed to win there in the 1990 assembly elections. Our victory made the landlords and our rival political parties desperate. Tension continued to spread and in Ara town a grenade was hurled at our Mahadharna killing one comrade and injuring many others. This prompted a general call for retaliation against Bhumihars even remotely connected with Ranvir Sena, barring children and women. In a single day eight Ranvir Sena men fell victims to the people’s wrath. Killings and counter-killings went on, culminating in an attack by people’s forces killing nine Ranvir Sena supporters at Narhi, just prior to the 1996 parliamentary elections. At this juncture the administration proposed banning our Party and resorted to massive oppression. In 1996 elections however, we more or less maintained our dominance in Sahar and Sandesh.

In the meantime, the centre of conflict had shifted to in and around Bathani Tola. A movement for liberating Karbala land was launched in Karpahari and Nawadih and in the process two influential Rajput leaders became victims of people’s anger. Ranvir Sena organisers and BJP’s political leadership cashed in on their favourite communal card and effected a unity of Rajputs and Bhumihars. This eventually led to the Bathani Tola massacre. Local people’s squads had thwarted several such attacks on Bathani, Chauri and other nearby villages and a practice had developed of people from different villages rushing in to help each other. In Bathani Tola, on that fateful day, the local squad kept the attackers at bay but then a fighter was hit (he subsequently died) and they had run out of ammunition and were forced to make a retreat. Due to some confusions, reinforcements from other villages arrived too late. A powerful political protest movement was also launched on Bathani Tola including a fast-unto-death launched by our MLA Rameshwar Prasad.

Despite Bathani Tola, people were in fighting mood but swift and immediate retaliatory action could not take place owing to a lot of confusion. A direction-less situation prevailed and demand for higher firepower, for sophisticated arms, to fight the well-armed Ranvir Sena assumed prominence.

A daring attempt was made in one case to smash the armed gang of Ranvir Sena but it didn’t succeed fully. Any selective killing from the people’s side resulted in indiscriminate killing of many by Ranvir Sena. The intelligence network remained totally crippled due to high degree of caste polarisation; thus we were deprived of concrete information about the movement of their main armed core.

Ranvir Sena and its social base were jubilant and people’s morale went down. It was a situation of setback and as always happens this gave rise to confusion and debates. One particular view was that our slogan of smashing the savarna (upper caste) feudal dominance and our targeting of broad range of upper caste landowners had led to their high degree of caste mobilisation. This view seems to be an oversimplification and one-sided. Our slogans only reflected the objectivity of the existing characteristics of feudalism prevailing in Bhojpur. We did smash the upper caste mobilisation of Jwala Singh, and despite this slogan succeeded in neutralising a good section of Rajputs in Bihta by repeated explaining our policies of differentiation among different classes.

Actually, by the time the Ranvir Sena phenomenon began, we had already changed our slogan to opposing the communal-feudal dominance reflecting the political development of upper caste feudals switching over to BJP. There were excesses and they did play a role but in no case were they decisive. We conducted special propaganda campaigns among Bhumihars through propaganda leaflets and through peace campaigns, entering into honourable compromises with middle sections and organise seminars where Bhumihar intellectuals attended in large numbers. Despite all odds, the valiant comrades of Bhojpur have persisted in their struggle.

The earlier offensive of Ranvir Sena has now tuned into a stalemate. We have been gradually seizing back the initiative. But they still retain their main armed strength and have now declared their mission to be the assassination of the main Party leaders. They are still capable of creating trouble and organising massacres. Hence there is no room for complacency. We must keep up pressure to move into an offensive. The district committee, through detailed discussions and through a series of cadre conventions has reviewed the whole course of struggle against Ranvir Sena, strengthened its unity, and resolved to carry on the struggle till victory. Bhojpur has done it so many times and once again its gearing up to seize victory.

[From the Political-Organisational Report of the Sixth Party Congress.]

Our struggle against Ranvir Sena has been going on for more than three years now in Bhojpur. In all, the Ranvir Sena has so far killed 162 persons out of which 20, including four local squad commanders and eight local activists were our Party members, 15 to 20 were attached to JD or Samata and there were a good number of politically neutral persons who were killed just because they were of dalit or backward background. In retaliation, around 76 Ranvir Sena activists and sympathisers have become victims of people’s anger. However, the main organisers of Ranvir Sena as well as their main armed core still remain intact.

This Sena has emerged as the most notorious and most ruthless private army of landlords in over 25 years of our movement in Bhojpur and the battle against it has proved to be quite protracted and tough. They have killed people with impunity, hurled grenades on our mass gatherings and even attacked our Party office. They have also planned to kill important Party leaders.

As the rural proletariat in Bhojpur has emerged as the ‘class-for-itself’ and, from a position of total marginalisation, has come to occupy the centrestage in the political process of this district under the banner of its Party, the CPI(ML), and since this has threatened the hegemony of both the JD and the BJP and exposed the ideological-political bankruptcy of CPI-CPI(M), an unholy alliance is quite natural. As the movement in Bhojpur has brought to the fore the class struggles of rural poor for political hegemony and the mass struggles of oppressed dalit castes for social equality, the feudal classes and castes have resorted to the tactics of mass terror, most brutalised killings of innocent persons including women and children. The form of struggle adopted by feudal classes is not an aberration but is dictated by the very dynamic of class struggle.

In political terms, we did make Bathani Tola a big agitational issue, from a militant assembly gherao to mobilising nationwide democratic opinion and ultimately forced the government to transfer the DM and SP and institute an enquiry. But at the grassroots, plans for smashing the main armed gang of Ranvir Sena could not materialise.

We have achieved primary success in arming people in innumerable villages. Militant sections capable of resistance have come up in many villages. The Party has conducted ideological struggle against three dependencies: 1) On higher varieties of firearms: the Party has instead stressed on reviving the old tradition of guerrilla actions where even with conventional arms an enemy equipped with more sophisticated firearms could be defeated; 2) On relying on the administration: instead we put stress on developing the capacity of people’s resistance; and 3) On instructions from higher committees: we have emphasised instead unleashing local initiatives within the broad policy framework, particularly with regard to swift retaliatory actions.

With the Ranvir Sena becoming stronger it began targeting Yadavs too. Gradually we have started changing the social balance by winning over sections of the Yadav peasantry and youth. This has led to some successful actions. We have stepped up our propaganda among Bhumihars too and now it appears that some cracks are deepening and conflicts among them are getting sharper. We carefully avoided opening up a second front against Rajputs and this to an extent kept their participation at low key. Certain recent initiatives on floods and other issues of relief taken by the Kisan Sabha have witnessed mobilisation on a broad scale. In a recent incident in Ara town, four persons kidnapped by Ranvir Sena were rescued and two Ranvirs were handed over to police.

Local people’s squads are gradually stepping up their offensive and the Ranvir Sena nowadays is not as quick in retaliating as earlier. However, developing an intelligence network and tracking down the main operators is still a neglected area of work.

[From the Political-Organisational Report of the Sixth Party Congress, 1997.]

1) To summarise, we find that the land question still remains the major question in many areas. However, as the degree of implementation of land reforms differs from one state to another, the general slogan of advancing land reforms also takes different forms in different states.

2) Establishing people’s control over common property such as minor irrigation sources (Ahar, Pokhar, Talab etc.), rivers and sandbanks etc. is a major agenda of struggle. Generally, feudals and mafia groups exercise control over them.

3) The questions of wages, equal wages for equal work for men and women, better working conditions, homestead land and pucca houses etc. are more or less common demands of the rural proletariat throughout the country. In the case of land grants it should be demanded that pattas should be issued in the names of both men and women.

4) Issues of corruption in panchayats, in block offices where money intended for relief to the rural poor or for the benefit of small and middle peasants is siphoned off by corrupt officials in league with powerful landlords and kulak groups who also control the political power are very important in popular mobilisation.

5) Tribal questions, whether they are reflected through the Jharkhand movement or in the movements of hill districts and other tribal areas of Assam, or in the girijan movement in Andhra Pradesh etc. are essentially peasant questions, and therefore usurpation of tribal land by usurers/merchants, rights over forest land and forest produce etc., are major questions in these areas.

6) Wherever the movement assumes intensity, private armies of landlords or the goons of the reactionary political parties resort to killing Party leaders and cadres and organise massacres of people. Police atrocities also invariably follow.

7) Anarchist organisations which are degenerating into money-collecting machines are indulging in a killing-spree of our cadres and people, and are using ultra-left rhetoric to the hilt to cover up their dubious links and their dirty mission of disrupting organised mass movements.

The following points merit serious attention:

A. We think that owing to considerable variations in the agrarian situation, a general peasant movement at national level, and therefore a consolidated all-India peasant body, would not have much of relevance. An all-India coordination body to exchange experiences and occasionally issue policy statements and organise seminars, workshops etc. is enough. Even in the states, district or regional level kisan sabha formations may have to play important autonomous roles, as in big states conditions vastly differ from one region to another. Demand-specific and area-specific peasant organisations may also play an important role in mobilising the broad peasantry.

Due attention should be paid to strengthening the organisational functioning of the kisan sabha at district and local levels. In many areas, kisan sabha membership falls much short of our influence among the peasantry and is often even less than the number of people mobilised in our programmes. Live functioning of the village committees holds the key to the vibrancy of the kisan sabha organisation, even amidst severe enemy repression. These committees should regularly convene village general body meetings of the peasant association, discuss the problems of the movement, and membership renewal — and even recruitment — should preferably be done in GBs. The village committees should be strengthened with the perspective of developing them as local organs of people’s power. Training local militias and building up of village self-defence squads should be undertaken in a planned manner.

A legal cell to take care of cases and a special team to maintain contact with comrades in jail need to be developed.

Where feasible, women’s cells should be formed within the kisan sabha organisations.

Contradictions among people may better be handled by local kisan sabha units instead of the Party directly plunging into them in the first instance. Otherwise there remains no authority to which aggrieved sections can turn to and this results in their alienation. Our experience shows that anarchist groups as well as forces like Ranvir Sena are quite adept in using such contradictions against us. Therefore, contradictions among people must be handled prudently and carefully and through the kisan sabha.

B. The question of agrarian labourers however is increasingly assuming greater importance in the agrarian scene as well as in national politics. The demand for central legislation relating to them is becoming a powerful one. The process of increasing capitalist penetration of whichever variety in agriculture — under the auspices of liberalisation and globalisation — will further push the question of agricultural labourers to the fore.

Moreover, as sections of intermediate castes are also emerging as important power groups, the agrarian movement can only find itself confronting increasingly wide-ranging sections of capitalist farmers and rich peasants. Movements of agrarian labourers, therefore, shall assume important political connotations. To prepare for the future, we shall have to organise a preparatory committee to study the issue in depth and explore the possibility of launching an agrarian labourers organisation.

C. When we get trapped in wars of attrition against private armies, the functioning of peasant associations or movements on peasant issues are left behind. Such a situation is of course forced on us and we can do little to avoid it. But how, then, to continue the functioning of peasant association is a paramount question which we have not been able to solve as yet. We repeatedly tried to use any lull period to activate such movements but no proper mechanism could be developed. Initiatives from state-level peasant association leadership at this juncture may be of crucial importance. And demand-specific organisations may come in handy to tackle such situations.

D. The spate of massacres that we faced in the last few years have raised many questions inside and outside the Party. The most simplistic formulation was provided by anarchists and a section of expert commentators living in the safe world of the media who opined that as CPI(ML) has given up the armed struggle and taken up parliamentary struggle, landlords are taking up the revenge for the 1970s, i.e., for annihilations carried out 25 years ago! This is highly mischievous and subjective thinking at its most absurd.

As Marxists we must understand that the emergence of a new breed of private army and the present spate of massacres are intimately related with the dynamics of present-day politics. If one probes deeper, one can easily see that the intensity of operations of private armies is concentrated mainly in areas where we have thrown up a serious parliamentary challenge to major ruling parties. Sahar and Sandesh assembly constituencies of Bhojpur and Mairwan and Darauli of Siwan are such areas. Even JMM (Mardi)-sponsored MCC killings in Bishungarh and the RJD-sponsored MCC massacre in that part of Chatra which borders Barachetti were shrewd moves to weaken our electoral prospects. As in both these constituencies we present a strong potential threat to JMM (Mardi) and RJD respectively. This is further confirmed by MCC’s march to areas of Barachetti just a few days after the Chatra massacre, and its threatening demands that the people leave Maley. This was immediately followed by RJD’s campaign in Barachetti asking people to desert CPI(ML). Targeting Bagodar is part of the same gameplan.

After private armies with the active connivance of the administrative machinery are allowed to perpetrate massacres, Laloo Yadav reaches those spots with the compensation packages and calls upon the people not to take up arms and instead take to education etc. It is in this way that the butcher and the priest complement each other. Whatever problems the anarchists may pose to the law and order situation they don’t pose any challenge to the political hegemony of the ruling classes. If in 1970s the call for election boycott was the expression of extreme revolutionary advance, in ’90s it has degenerated into extreme opportunist betrayal. This is how, dialectically, things transform into their opposites with the change in conditions. The election boycott slogan of anarchist groups has come in handy for shrewd bourgeois politicians. There are innumerable evidences of MCC and PU cadres actively mobilising votes for JD candidates in Bihar elections.

Then again it is totally false to suggest that we have given up the policy of armed resistance. The fact is that the general arming of the masses has today reached a much higher level than at any other time. In hundreds of villages in Bihar the regular exchange of fire has been going on through all these years of parliamentary politics. Thousands of our comrades including entire district committee leaderships have been warranted throughout the state for organising resistance and have to work in almost underground conditions.

In short, it is not our retreat but our advance as a major force challenging the economic, social and political hegemony of the forces of status quo that has led to these sharp attacks against us. It should never be forgotten that political initiatives, movements on popular issues and developing popular resistance are the key elements in taking up the challenge of the combined onslaught of feudal forces and the state. The point is not just to smash this or that sena by some method or other. More important is to raise the political consciousness of people, effect a change in social and political balance of forces and ensure the broadest mobilisation of the people in the process. Otherwise we will be reduced to being just a militant outfit. Yet, as protracted armed conflicts are an inalienable part of peasant movement in Bihar, Party must intensify its state of preparedness. In particular, decisive blows to the enemy are of crucial importance and armed formations must be organised at a higher level to deliver these blows.

[Published in two parts in September-October and November issues of Liberation, 1993.]

I

Our agrarian revolution has three basic propositions:

1. It is a part of democratic revolution and the content of this revolution will be the liberation of countryside from feudal remnants.

2. In its social and economic aspect, this agrarian revolution will be a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It will not weaken but stimulate the development of capitalism and capitalist class contradictions.

3. Communists must support and lead this revolution in a most resolute fashion, and while not tying their hands to certain commitments, they must formulate their immediate demands to facilitate thoroughgoing cleansing of feudal remnants, or in other words, to achieve the maximum bourgeois democratic reforms.

Regarding the orientation of communist party programme, Lenin often approvingly referred to the following quote of Kautsky:

"The communist programme is not written for the given moment, as far as possible it should cover all eventualities in present-day society. It should serve not only for practical action, but for propaganda as well; in the form of concrete demands it should indicate more vividly than abstract programmes can do, the direction in which we can set ourselves without straying into utopian speculation, the better the direction in which we are advancing will be all the clearer to the masses — even to those who are unable to grasp our theoretical premises. The programme should show what we demand of existing society or of the existing state and not what we expect of it."

After the question of propositions of agrarian revolution and the orientation of the communist programme is settled, it will not be out of place to understand the crucial difference between the agrarian programmes of communist parties in developed countries and those in undeveloped or under-developed capitalist countries where feudal remnants continue to remain very powerful in the agrarian sphere.

To quote Lenin again: " In the West, agrarian programmes are written for the purpose of drawing those who are half-peasants, half-workers into the communist movement against the bourgeoisie; while in our countries such programmes are meant to draw the peasant masses into the democratic movement against the remnants of the serf-owning system. That is why in the West the significance of the agrarian programme will become all the greater, the more agricultural capitalism develops. The practical significance of our agrarian programme will decrease as far as most of its demands are concerned, the more agrarian capitalism develops, since the remnants of serf ownership this programme is directed against are dying out, both of themselves and as a result of the governmental policy".

This situation brings two options before communists that divide them into two camps of opportunists and revolutionaries. The opportunist section advocates spontaneity and even turns into an appendage of the government under the pretext of pressurising it to move at a faster pace. Some even go to the extent of advocating entrepreneurship on the part of activists to accelerate the process of agrarian capitalism; thus deserting the communist camp, they go to the non-political way of social reforms under the auspices of voluntary organisations and in collaboration with the bureaucracy.

The revolutionary section, on the other hand, advocates a radical agrarian programme to seize the political initiative and mobilise peasant masses for a speedy and thoroughgoing sweeping away of feudal remnants.

Here we must also remember that remnants of feudal relationship in the countryside are often closely interwoven with capitalist relationships and peasants, including even small peasants, are linked to this or that extent with the market mechanism where the state plays a mediator’s role through credits, subsidies, procurement, etc. Hence in the period of political changes it is often seen that the governments are able to split the peasants and weaken their revolutionary spirit by announcing certain concessions like waiving loans etc. In most of the cases, these are minor and insignificant concessions, and that too, to a small number of petty proprietors. The more the government reaches an agreement with the conservative section of peasantry, the more radical will be our demands with which to arouse the revolutionary sections of peasantry to move forward, while pocketing whatever little concessions are available to them.

Coming to the central demand of the peasantry, the question of general redistribution of land comes first. It must be kept in mind that this demand too is interpreted as socialist by the advocates of peasant socialism, i.e., those who consider peasants and not workers as the vehicle of socialist revolution. They imagine that by a general redistribution of land, small peasant production can be generalised and made a perpetual system. We reject this reactionary utopian idea of peasant socialism and point out that general redistribution will only facilitate capitalism, the differentiation of peasantry and the class contradictions. Still we support this demand because it contains the revolutionary element of sweeping away by means of a peasant revolt all the remnants of feudalism.

II

First of all, it must be made clear that nationalisation of land in bourgeois democratic revolution essentially means the transfer of rent to the state. It does not contradict the general democratic slogan of land to the tiller. Land is transferred to the tiller in both the cases of general redistribution and nationalisation of land as well. The question essentially relates to the form of ownership. In the former case, the ownership is transferred to the peasants, and in the latter, it rests with the state which allots the land to the tiller on a lease-basis for a definite period of time on a definite rent. In nationalisation all middlemen between the state and the peasant are abolished.

Nationalisation of land is often contused with socialisation of agricultural production. In socialisation not only land but all other means of production are nationalised and the cultivation is organised collectively in big state farms. It is obvious that what we are talking about is the bourgeois nationalisation of land which will do away with all feudal remnants, help organise the cultivation in a most rational way and thus accelerate the fullest development of capitalism.

Capitalism invariably reorganises the old feudal land ownerships. It does so, however, by different methods in different countries.

In Germany, the reshaping of medieval forms of landed property proceeded in a reformist way. The feudal estates were slowly converted into Junker estates. In England, this reshaping proceeded in a revolutionary violent way; but the violence was practised for the benefit of landlords; it was practised on the masses of peasants who were taxed to exhaustion and driven from the villages.

In America this reshaping went on in a violent way as regards the slave farms in southern states. There violence was applied against the slave-owning landlords. Their estates were broken up, and the large feudal estates were transformed into small bourgeois farms.

The view that nationalisation is feasible only at a high stage of development of capitalism has been consistently repudiated by Lenin.

Says Lenin, "Theoretically, nationalisation is the ‘ideally’ pure development of capitalism in agriculture. The question whether such a combination of conditions and such a relation of forces as would permit of nationalisation in capitalist society often occur in history is another matter. But nationalisation is not only an effect of, but also a condition for, the rapid development of capitalism. To think that nationalisation is possible only at a very high stage of development of capitalism in agriculture means, if anything the repudiation of nationalisation as a measure of bourgeois progress; for everywhere the high development of agricultural capitalism has already placed on the order of the day (and will in time inevitably place on the order of the day in other countries) the ‘socialisation of agricultural production’, i.e., the socialist revolution. No measure of bourgeois progress, as a bourgeois measure, is conceivable when the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is very acute. Such a measure is more likely in a young bourgeois country, which has not yet developed its strength, has not yet developed its contradictions to the full, and has not yet created a proletariat strong enough to strive directly towards the socialist revolution. And Marx allowed the possibility of, and sometimes directly advocated, the nationalisation of land, not only in the epoch of the bourgeois revolution in Germany in 1848, but also in 1846 for America, which, as he most accurately pointed out at that time, was only just starting its industrial development. The experience of various capitalist countries gives us no example of the nationalisation of land in anything like its pure form. We see something similar to it in New Zealand, a young capitalist democracy, where there is no evidence of highly developed agricultural capitalism. Something similar to it existed in America when the government passed the Homestead Act and distributed plots of land to small farmers at a nominal rent." (Lenin, Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy)

Marx never mentioned the underdeveloped state of capitalism in agriculture as an obstacle to the achievement of nationalisation. In his Theories of Surplus Value, Marx pointed out that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production, that the purpose of the latter is fully answered if the land belongs to the state.

Although in theory the radical bourgeois arrives at the repudiation of private landed property, in practice he is scared of nationalisation, as Marx pointed out, for two reasons.

Firstly, the radical bourgeois lacks the courage to attack private landed property because of the danger of a socialist attack on all private property, i.e., the danger of a socialist revolution.

Secondly, because the bourgeois mode of production has already entrenched itself in private landed property, i.e., that this private property has become far more bourgeois than feudal in developed capitalist countries. When the bourgeoisie, as a class, has already "territorialised itself", "settled on the land’, fully subordinated landed properly to itself, then a genuine social movement of the bourgeoisie in favour of nationalisation is impossible. It is impossible for the simple reason that no class ever goes against itself.

Speaking of Russia, however, Lenin says, "In all these respects the Russian bourgeois revolution finds itself in particularly favourable conditions. Arguing from the purely economic point of view, we must certainly admit the existence of a maximum of survivals of feudalism in Russia. Under such circumstances, the contradiction between relatively developed capitalism in industry and the appalling backwardness of the countryside becomes glaring and, owing to objective causes, makes the bourgeois revolution extremely far-reaching and creates conditions for the most rapid agricultural progress. The nationalisation of the land is precisely a condition for the most rapid capitalist progress in our agriculture. We have a ‘radical bourgeois’ in Russia who has not yet ‘territorialised’ himself, who cannot at present, fear a proletarian ‘attack’. That radical bourgeois is Russian peasant." (Ibid.)

Aren’t the Indian conditions similar to this description of Russian scene?

[From the Political-Organisational Report adopted at the Fourth Party Congress, 1987.]

The movement in central Bihar covers seven districts: Bhojpur, Rohtas, Patna, Gaya, Jehanabad, Aurangabad and Nalanda. Our Party is the main leading force behind it. This phase of peasant struggles in Bihar with its genesis in the heroic struggles of Bhojpur and Patna between 1972 and 1979, represents the third milestone after Telengana in 1946-49 and the Naxalbari phase of 1967-1971.

The present phase of peasant struggle began in the rural areas of Patna in the early ’80s and soon spread to Nalanda and Jehanabad. A new awakening took place in Bhojpur, Aurangabad, Rohtas and parts of Gaya. The government replied with massive police actions, sometimes termed as Operation Task Force. Assisting the armed gangs of landlords, better known as private armies, undertaking certain administrative and economic reforms, mobilising the support of different political parties, particularly the CPI and Sarvodaya groups, as well as of the news media — thus the government made multi-pronged attempts to suppress the movement. In the face of these governmental measures and due to our own tactical mistakes, we suffered setbacks and losses in certain areas and had to make retreats and readjustments in many other areas of operation. On the whole, however, we successfully countered these measures and succeeded in disintegrating the private armies, restricting our losses to a minimum and retaining the initiative in our hands.

In essence, the entire struggle revolves around three issues:

(i) For an increase in the wages of agrarian labourers who account for 30-40% of the rural population in these areas. Now a considerable section of landowners does not engage in field labour because of feudal traditions as well as the availability of cheap labour. Obviously, the target range of this struggle becomes quite large and provides scope to reactionaries for caste-based mobilisation and formation of private armies. The form of struggle usually resorted to is strike which often develops into armed confrontations. We stand for boldly expanding strike struggles over large areas, if possible including several blocks of a district. This is essential for the development of class consciousness and class solidarity among agrarian labourers and as communists, it is the foremost duty of ours to organise this class, the most advanced revolutionary detachment in the countryside. Contrary to the liberal mode of thinking which prefers to avoid this struggle for the sake of so-called broad peasant unity, in actual practice, organising the strike struggle over a large area alone can break the reactionary alliance of landowners, and facilitate compromise with the middle sections.

(ii) For the seizure of surplus, vested and homestead land under the occupation of landlords, mahants and rich peasants; and distribution of the same among landless and poor peasants. In this struggle the target-range is narrowed down to the possible minimum. Generally, the middle sections possessing vested lands are spared and the course of persuasion and exerting pressure is adopted in the case of rich peasants. In the distribution of land, attempts are made to involve and unify the people. The seizure of lands, crops, ponds, and assertion over fishing rights in canals or rivers etc. often lead to armed confrontations.

In the whole process of seizure and distribution of land, acquisition of patta rights, organising the production, and finally, in preventing usurpation of the gains by dubious elements from among the people, the struggle generally tends to get blocked at one stage or another. There are, perhaps, more instances of failure than success. Of late, with the formulation of proper policy guidelines and stricter implementation, things however seem to be improving.

(iii) For the social dignity of dalits and backward castes. As it strikes at the root of feudal authority, this struggle tends to become quite intense and the entire range of upper castes of babusahebs, babhans and babajis becomes the target. On the other hand, such struggles draw support from almost all the classes of backward castes. There are always some exceptions though, from both the sides. Generally, in all the villages a small section of progressive people from upper castes cooperate with this struggle, while sections of backward castes join hands with reactionaries from upper castes. Under the impact of struggle over all these years, certain sections of upper castes in several areas have begun to change their traditional attitudes.

To effect a greater polarisation among people on class lines and to unite broad sections of rural population, we are trying to take up many other related issues as well, say, recording of tenancy rights, mobilising people against the corruption of block officials, etc. The question of corruption is linked with agrarian development, as the lion’s share of benefits is usurped by these officials in collusion with local reactionaries. Besides, action against dacoit gangs, certain village development works, relief measures etc. are also taken up to unite the broad masses of rural population.

We hold that only an integrated programme of struggles and activities on all such issues can ensure broad peasant unity under the leadership of agrarian labourers and poor peasants. We are often accused by opportunists of all hues of disrupting the broad peasant unity and of pitting agrarian labourers against peasants. By sacrificing the interests of agrarian labourers and poor peasants and by refusing to mobilise them in mass struggles, their class consciousness and class solidarity cannot be developed, nor can their leadership be established over the peasant movement. Naturally, the so-called broad peasant unity simply boils down to unity under the leadership of rich peasants. There is no middle way.

We still cannot claim to have altered the class and caste balance in our favour, but gradually we are heading towards building this unity on a new basis. In certain areas, middle peasants and middle sections of upper castes are also being mobilised under the banner of Kisan Sabha.

It must be mentioned here that the Party Consolidation Campaign was taken up quite seriously and effectively in these areas. Neglecting the task of party building, particularly during the phase of high tides in the movement, has been a common weakness in our Party’s history. And this has been the main reason behind long-term setbacks in many areas. Strengthening the Party is imperative for checking negative tendencies which appear in the course of the movement, for formulating correct policies and ensuring their implementation, for transforming the hundreds of activists brought into the fore by the movement into permanent assets of the Party, and of course, for continuing the struggle and raising it to ever higher levels.

Now, there is a certain trend of thought which belittles this role of conscious effort on the plea that it hampers the growth of peoples’ independent initiatives. In fact, it is not excess of conscious efforts but the lack of it which derails the struggle, strengthens a narrow peasant mentality, degenerates the fighters into bandits and bogs the struggle down in futile skirmishes, and ultimately blocks the independent initiative of the people. The MCC’s indulgence in caste war of attrition in parts of Aurangabad and the COC(PU)’s activities in certain parts of Jehanabad confirm this. We too have similar experiences in parts of Patna, Nalanda and Jehanabad. Fortunately, our Party organisation has, in the main, overcome such negative trends and Party work is now organised in a more rational way. And it was the Party Consolidation Campaign, which brought about the essential breakthrough in this regard.

In the course of our practice in the past few years many new features have come up in the movement which are being popularised in the entire region and the whole work is undergoing a certain reorganisation. Let us briefly discuss these changes and new developments in this chapter.

Forming Village Committees

We found that in a certain village in Bhojpur, local comrades were going about the formation of village committee in a way different from the formal one practised till then by the Kisan Sabha. The village was a local centre of struggle and while forming the village committee a new dynamic concept was introduced there. They vowed to turn the formation of the village committee into a festival of the masses, and step-by-step mobilised them in democratically electing their own committee. We have seen in our past experience that during the upsurge in the movement, people built up their own village committees as the centre of all activities. In contrast, the formation of village committees by the Kisan Sabha as its lowest unit appeared to be too stereotyped, too formal an affair. In many a case, the village committee simply turned into a village development body, devoid of class struggle and detached from the Kisan Sabha. Taking the cue from the Bhojpur experiment the Party subsequently improved upon the concept of village committee. The village committee came to be emphasised as the key to releasing the people’s initiative at the grassroots level, as a living mechanism for enhancing their democratic consciousness, integrating into their subjective consciousness the concept of revolutionary democracy. Militant movements or general political mobilisations of peasants do not resolve the problem of revolutionisation of the consciousness of the broad masses which would enable them to grasp the futility of the bourgeois organs of formal democracy. Village committees built upon the basis of developing class struggle and practising democratic norms to the core help the masses differentiate in concrete terms between our democracy and their democracy. Consciously oriented by the Communist Party, these committees may be transformed into revolutionary committees in the future.

Building Pockets

To fight the roving style of work of our organisers and strengthen the Party apparatus at the grassroots, we introduced the concepts of pockets. Every organiser is assigned a pocket of 10 to 15 villages by the Party committee concerned and there he is instructed to develop a Party unit and along with it an entire network of organisations so that even in times of white terror he can stay in his pocket, maintain contacts with the masses there and organise them in protest actions. He can leave the pocket only when so instructed by the Party Committee. This concept has lent more seriousness to the work of the organisers, increased the involvement of many organiser comrades who were earlier on the periphery of the Party organisation and also helped them plan and organise their work better. Such pockets are regularly assessed and classified accordingly. The number of pockets and of organisers making serious and successful efforts is increasing and in certain pockets strong Party units have already developed.

Reorganising the Peasant Association

Emphasis has been placed on organising peasant associations at block levels, first concentrating on a belt of 30 to 40 villages and then gradually spreading the work to the rest of the block. As the brunt of the most severe repression has to be borne by the local level peasant associations, a certain restructuring of their leadership has been felt necessary. It is not a wise policy to open all of one’s leaders before the enemy. They should, therefore, learn to function in a rather semi-underground way. On the other hand, they have been asked to launch extensive membership drives, mobilise masses in a big way during their conferences and interfere more and more in the affairs of Block offices so as to expose the real nature of the various reforms undertaken by the administration.

Peasant associations in some areas have also organised conferences of tenants and of middle peasants. At some places they have organised sittings with general peasant representatives from different villages, so as to learn first hand about their demands. At many places nowadays they storm the Block offices with hundreds and thousands of peasants and demand explanations from government officials, force government officials’ camps for relief and reforms to shift to poor people’s tolas (hamlets), and represent the demands of the masses on their behalf. Their slogan is: everything through the peasant associations. This has helped frustrate the government designs to subvert the organisation through distribution of meagre relief.

Organising Village Defence Corps

In comparison to earlier periods this aspect is now receiving greater attention. In certain areas large number of youth are organised in such forces. Armed with spears, they spell panic in the enemies’ hearts. It is they who play the main role in resistance struggles, in rescuing peasant leaders and in organising and protecting processions. These village defence forces operate under the command of village committees.

These are the forms of organisations at the lower level which since the beginning of the Party Consolidation Campaign, are being organised with greater emphasis and clarity. Charpokhri in Bhojpur, Islampur in Nalanda and Daoodnagar in Aurangabad are three areas where all the aspects of work discussed so far have been combined to a considerable extent. Many are the old areas of work where some of these aspects have been implemented and there have also emerged many new pockets of work in Rohtas and Gaya districts. In the districts of Nalanda and Aurangabad where the Party structure had been very weak for a long time, the district Party committee as well as the overall Party structure is now much better organised.

People’s Armed Forces

Not all comrades know that by the end of 1975 we were left with only one armed unit in Sahar, Bhojpur, and that this armed unit too had developed strong roving tendencies and that it had become difficult even for the political commissar to manage it. And subsequently, we had to disperse its members as individual organisers by the end of 1976. Another armed unit was then just in the making, centring Comrade Jiut in a new area of work. In Patna, too, only one armed unit was left and that too had reached the point of dissolution. The majority of leaders and cadres were either killed or arrested. White terror was prevailing all over our old areas and the masses were subdued. The remaining Party organisers, however, carried on the work defying harsh conditions and kept the flame of struggle alive. Without the Rectification Movement in 1977 and without the drastic changes in the political line in the 1979 Special Conference, there would have been no peasant struggle or armed struggle today. Armed actions with a new spirit were revived from 1977 onwards and, in terms of the number of armed units and firearms, in terms of scale of their operation, today we far surpass our earlier phase. Today’s village committees exercise much more authority than the revolutionary committees of those days and today’s red patches are far redder than the red areas of that time. This advance in real life has been rendered possible by our retreat in concepts, whereas the earlier advance in concepts meant retreat in real life.

Still, we prefer to call the revolutionary peasant struggle in Bihar as being at its primary stage. This means, we shall have to go a long way in changing the balance of class forces. We must preserve our forces, accumulate strength and step by step expand and raise the struggle to higher levels.

The state of our armed forces is dictated by this reality. For years, we made desperate efforts to build regular armed units in as big numbers as possible. Our experience shows that though many fighters came to join such units, eventually only some could stay. They were basically those who could be developed to the level of Party cadres. Despite all our efforts, the growth of regular and stable armed units remained quite slow.

Basing on these conditions, we decided to put emphasis on building local squads. Now, not much progress could be made in this direction because of our inability to concretise tasks for such squads in the new situation. To begin with, we discouraged the earlier practice of building squads for and through annihilations. Then the concept of armed propaganda squads was clinched and such local armed squads were defined as the link between regular armed units and village defence forces. Areas comprising 15-20 villages were demarcated where these squads would march as armed propaganda squads for a fixed period every month. Many fighters who could not stay in regular armed units were mobilised in these squads. Regular units maintain links with them and whenever necessary they are mobilised in armed action. They take action against local reactionaries and snatch firearms on their own initiatives. They also organise general village youth in village defence forces.

In the present phase of armed struggle, we feel that the main emphasis should be laid on these armed propaganda squads. They also provide the necessary infrastructure for regular armed units, and in future, regular armed units can be developed extensively recruiting forces from these squads.

In the last few years, our regular armed units suffered some serious losses at Kaithi (Aurangabad), Kunai (Bhojpur) and Gangabigha (Nalanda). Analysis of all these cases reveals that agents from within the villages concerned, supplied information to the landlords and from there it went to the police. We had remained in the dark about the activities of these agents and the whole concept of security of our armed units had revolved around remaining alert about the landlords and the known agents and, of course, undertaking nightlong vigil in the darkness.

After these incidents, agents in all the cases were punished with death. But these exemplary punishments have not, and could not have, wiped out the entire intelligence network of the enemy. Class struggle is a very complex process and our enemy is quite capable of recruiting its agents from our own villages. In the face of our sharp retaliations, the enemy network often gets snapped, but then it is soon restored in ways more shrewd and subtle.

Our concept of security had been too simplistic and outmoded for any modern war. Now we are laying emphasis on building our own intelligence network. We should cultivate sources within the enemy camp, and recruit trained personnel for specific intelligence purposes. Apart from a regular armed unit and an integrated system of local armed squads, any complete system of armed formation, even at this stage, must have its own intelligence network, sources for manufacturing and procuring components of firearms, a medical branch and a scout system. Only such a complete system can provide armed units with the necessary freedom in their movements and only then can they have adequate initiative in their operations. We consider it necessary that Party district committees in these areas must appoint a capable comrade at the district level to look after the building of this system. Armed units and armed struggles are not playthings and there should not be any casual attitude towards them.

At this stage of the struggle, the regular armed units should concentrate on organising decisive armed actions against powerful armed gangs of the landlords. They should also defend the masses in the face of police atrocities and mete out appropriate punishments to the erring police officials.

In conclusion, I must say that:

This is for the first time that Indian communists have succeeded in continuing the peasant struggle over such a long period, steadily expanding its frontiers.

This is for the first time that Indian communists have taken up all forms of struggle, legal and illegal, extra-parliamentary and parliamentary, armed actions and mass struggles, and made serious efforts to combine them, without surrendering one for the other.

This is for the first time that Indian communists have tried to tackle the problems of both caste and class struggle, dealing a heavy blow to caste oppression, simultaneously enabling dalits to raise their heads while uniting agrarian labourers, poor and middle peasants on their class demands.

This is for the first time that innumerable leaders and cadres have emerged from among the ranks of the rural poor and it is they who form the main core of the Party. It is they who organise and lead the work and struggle on all fronts. And broad sections of rural poor have been mobilised in direct political struggle of national importance.

And, this is for the first time that Indian communists have succeeded in defending the unity of the party organisation spearheading the struggle, despite all manoeuvrings of ruling classes, despite all disruptionist activities of liquidationists and semi-anarchists, despite all the stresses and strains of setbacks and losses. We have made drastic changes in our line and policies, we had serious differences and debates among ourselves, but we always acted unitedly in a firm, disciplined manner.


May 13, 1986

If a colossal miscarriage[1] allowed social-democracy to flourish in full bloom in the Indian communist movement, to be sure, social-democrats too had to pay a heavy price for their victory: doomed as an essentially regional force, they could never really make any dent in the Hindi heartland. What else can one infer from the CPI(M)’s total failure to make any headway in Bihar despite presiding over a full-fledged model of social-democracy in neighbouring West Bengal for no less than nine years in succession?

"Bihar is one of the most backward of Indian states, beset with rigid caste polarisations and devoid of any history of bourgeois reforms worth the name", argue Namboodiripad and Co.[2] Well, these facts are as indisputable as the law — where social-democracy ends, revolutionary-democracy begins its journey. The same backward Bihar has proved to be a forward post of revolutionary-democracy, with the lowest rung of society being drawn into the vortex of peasant struggles. From the Pipra carnage to the Arwal massacre, blood-thirsty landlord-armies to trigger-happy paramilitary forces, protagonists of ‘total revolution’ to ‘His Majesty’s Opposition’ — none could enforce the ‘peace’ of the graveyard on the flaming fields of Bihar and none would be able to drive these unconventional actors to the backstage of historical action.

But, will the struggle of the Bihar peasantry really be able to blaze a new trail? Or, will it also go the way of all its predecessors, ending in a disaster or in a compromise halfway? Today this question is haunting all sincere Marxists as well as all who sympathise with the cause of revolutionary democracy. The present book is the first of a series of attempts to deal with precisely this question. But before we enter the main body of the book, let us have a glance at the crisscross pattern of the Indian communist movement and then examine the specific course of the Bihar peasantry.

The relations with the peasantry and with the bourgeoisie are two fundamental questions of tactics to be solved by the communist parties in backward countries with preponderant peasant populations. Way back in 1919, Lenin had advised the communists of the Eastern countries to work out their own strategy basing on the general lessons of Russia’s Bolshevik revolution. He had warned them that they might not get the answers to their problems in any communist book.

It was precisely this task that Mao Tse-tung undertook in right earnest while the leadership of the Indian communist party miserably failed to grasp its significance. Thus, while CPC succeeded in correctly solving the questions concerning the Communist Party’s relations with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie at various stages of China’s democratic revolution and went on to emerge as the leader of the national liberation struggle, thereby providing valuable guidelines for integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete conditions of backward countries, the Indian communists could not develop any consistent line to deal with the two aforesaid problems. As a result, the Indian National Congress stole the show in India’s struggle for national liberation, while the communists came to be regarded as its appendage and even as traitors to the cause of freedom. True, there were various factors that did contribute to this failure. For instance, the colonial rule of the British bourgeoisie; the emergence and development of the Congress as a forum with a queer admixture of a highly developed democratic functioning on the surface (regular sessions, changing presidents, various crosscurrents coexisting and competing among themselves etc.) and the extra-organisational authority of Gandhi based on almost blind reverence at the core; the peculiar national, caste and communal issues; the conflicting pieces of advice from the Comintern and from certain Indian leaders guiding the Party from abroad etc. What was really strange, however, was that the dominant section of the leadership developed a line of thinking that put the Russian and Chinese experiences of revolution in general and Lenin and Mao in particular in contradistinction to each other, and concentrated all energies at pointing at differences in the Indian and Chinese conditions. What a great predicament! The Communist Party of India refused to learn anything from the great revolution in the biggest Asian country, which incidentally was our neighbour too, and from the thoughts of its undisputed leader Mao Tse-tung. It had nothing but ridicule for this great leader.

With the defeat of P.C. Joshi’s line and in the context of the rise and fall of Telangana (1946-51), there emerged three distinct lines in the Indian communist movement. The line peddled by Ranadive and Co. rejected the significance of the Chinese revolution, ferociously attacked Mao as another Tito and advocated the simultaneous accomplishment of the democratic and the socialist revolutions based on city-based working-class insurrections. Drawing its sustenance from Stalin’s initial suspicion about the Chinese revolution and Mao Tse-tung, this left-adventurist line, however, ended in a great fiasco.

The line of the Andhra Secretariat drew heavily from the Chinese experiences and the teachings of Mao in building the heroic struggle of Telangana. But the Andhra leadership, while successfully spearheading the movement against the feudal autocracy of the Nizam in conjunction with the Andhra Mahasabha, failed to tackle the complex question of meeting the challenge of the Nehru government and its army. It could not have possibly done that in the prevailing situation and therefore the two line struggle within the Party could not be taken to its logical conclusion. Nevertheless, Telangana remains one of the glorious chapters in the history of peasant struggles led by the Communist Party till date and reminds us of the first serious effort by sections of the Communist Party leadership to learn from the experiences of the Chinese revolution and to develop a comprehensive line for India’s democratic revolution, taking agrarian revolution as the axis.

The Nehru government embarked on the road to parliamentary democracy, paving it with populist reforms like the zamindari abolition. Telangana having already suffered a setback, objective conditions facilitated the dominance of a centrist line put forward by Ajay Ghosh and Dange. This line made a big issue of the differences between Chinese and Indian conditions and pushed the Party along the parliamentary road.

In 1957 the communists succeeded in forming a government in Kerala, which however, was soon overthrown while attempting radical agrarian reforms. That was a critical juncture in the evolution of the tactics of utilising parliamentary struggles. While experience re-emphasised the need for developing peasant movements and subordinating all parliamentary struggles to extra-parliamentary ones, the Party refused to learn its lesson and continued to proceed along the beaten track. In subsequent years, following the emergence of Khruschovite revisionism and the India-China war, the Party split into two. The Dangeite leadership took a national chauvinist position and began to peddle the theory of the so-called ‘peaceful road to non-capitalist development’. This line of national democratic revolution of the CPI transformed it over the years into an appendage of the Congress. For it, feudal remnants either do not exist in India or can be well taken care of by the Congress government itself.

The CPI(M), the other faction, went ahead with the centrist line. In the old Ranadive tradition it continued to pit Stalin against Mao and therefore did not wholly subscribe to Khruschov either. It does speak of people’s democracy, but the people’s democracy of its conception is more akin to the people’s democracies of the East European variety. It goes on to denigrate the experiences of the Chinese revolution and has nothing but ridicule for Mao Tse-tung Thought. In recent years, Basavapunniah, the chief theoretical spokesman for the CPI(M), has further intensified attacks on Mao[3]. He has virulently attacked Mao’s philosophical position on contradictions and his tactics regarding the national bourgeoisie. Pointing to the differences between the Indian and Chinese conditions, the CPI(M) continues to preach the impossibility of partisan war in India, and has, once again started highlighting the old CPI appraisal of the Chinese revolution, according to which base areas and red army had played not much of a significant role in China, rather the massing of the Soviet troops in Manchuria during the Second World War had been mainly responsible for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

In their struggle against the national chauvinist leadership of the CPI, revolutionary communists allied themselves with the CPI(M). The Party went ahead with its parliamentary exercises, and, riding on the crest of mass movements, formed a United Front government in West Bengal through an opportunist coalition. The role of this government in suppressing the Naxalbari struggle exposed the revisionist character of the leadership and, by all standards, conditions were ripe for an all-out rebellion in the party. And rebellion it was — in West Bengal and Kerala the CPI(M) found its strength sufficiently eroded while in some states entire State Committees walked out in support of Naxalbari.

The spirit behind Naxalbari was the same as in Telangana, viz., the spirit of highlighting the role of peasant struggle in India’s democratic revolution, of drawing on the experiences of China and the teachings of Mao. However, the times had greatly changed. Naxalbari emerged against a new background: there was the great division in the international communist movement, land reforms and the democratic facade of the Congress had by then lost much of their earlier glamour, the country was facing a serious agrarian crisis that was being sought to be resolved through the imperialist strategy of green revolution, and to top it all, there was a grave political crisis as reflected in the first ever defeat of the Congress in the elections to many State Assemblies. In other words, Naxalbari emerged in a fine revolutionary situation when the ruling classes could no longer rule in the old way. It was a direct assault on the discredited and declining power. Moreover, this time the revisionist leadership of the party was also clearly on the other side of the fence, presiding over the police as it went on killing the peasants and the revolutionaries.

Different as the circumstances were, the impact was also different. Naxalbari did not stop at Naxalbari. With the building of, first, the AICCCR and then the CPI(ML), it spread like wildfire over many parts of India. The new revolutionary Party emphasised the scarlet thread that ran through Leninism and the entire course of its application in semi-colonial China by Mao Tse-tung. Making a clear break with the Indian variety of revisionism, it decided to incorporate, apart from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought too in its guiding ideology, and put greater emphasis on the similarities between the Indian and Chinese conditions. However, unlike some people who described themselves as Maoist communists, this new Party never declared itself as a Maoist party, but simply as the genuine Marxist-Leninist Party of India. To begin with, in its first steps on an entirely new course of Indian revolution, the new Party had no other option but to follow the Chinese model which at that time also provided the main form of struggles to the peoples of Vietnam as well as of other South-East Asian countries.

Telangana was resurrected in its spirit and colour. The air was charged with the slogans of guerilla war, red army and Yenan and the songs of the long march. The struggle spread to many parts of the country with West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh emerging as the main bastions. Thousands of students and youth jumped into the fray and revolution seemed so close. Naxalism, as a new brand of communist movement, became a national phenomenon and a new word in the political dictionary.

However, the euphoria was soon over. What had seemed to be the final enactment of revolution proved to be no more than a dress rehearsal. With hundreds having sacrificed their lives and thousands languishing in the jails, gloom set in, and as it always happens, it was accompanied by confusion, splits and disintegration. No one could be sure of the stand of this or that Party leader. People changed their positions unbelievably fast. Yesterday’s friends and close comrades became today’s adversaries.

For many, the dreams of liberation turned into veritable nightmares. Appeals were issued by leaders in jail, efforts were made to reorganise the scattered forces, but nothing could check the drift. History rolled on in its due course. For many participants of the movement it was simplify finished and finished for good, others continued to cherish the fond memories of the ’70s with the vain hope that a forceful repetition of the old slogans might resurrect the old situation as well, while still others based themselves on the naive assumption that the situation could be saved if only all the old fragments could be united somehow or other.

In its disorganised state, the movement gave rise to all possible trends and groupings and there ensued a protracted polemical war in the bitterest of fashions. All sorts of people, even those considered long dead or permanently silenced began to stage a comeback as though from oblivion. And with them came back the whole range of questions that were supposed to have been already resolved once and for all.

The point was how to revive the movement. Some felt it was enough to condemn the ‘line of annihilations’, boycott of elections and trade unions, and so on. Some even went so far as to condemn the CPI(ML) itself and thought that the answer lay in reviving the AICCCR.

In the period following Emergency, Charu Mazumdar was projected as a discredited revolutionary in West Bengal itself as the scene came to be dominated by SN Singh and his PCC. And then came the final blow from Kanu Sanyal who informed the world that the very struggle in Naxalbari was his brainchild, that it was he who had built it up, resisting Charubabu’s left-adventurist forays while Charu Mazumdar only destroyed it by overriding Kanubabu’s proposal of coming to a tactical agreement with the United Front government (perhaps in the old fashion of ‘withdrawal’ of the Telangana struggle by the then Party leadership in 1951).

While all this went on under the reign of social-democracy in West Bengal, and to a great extent, in Andhra too (the residual leadership in Srikakulam as well as the CP Reddy faction having already joined hands with SN Singh), Bihar had an altogether different story to tell. And to be sure, from much earlier periods.

As alternatives to the Gandhian strategy of freedom struggle and in contrast to it, if Bengal excelled in terrorism and in the ‘leftism’ of the Subhas variety and Bombay in the strikes of the working class, Bihar came up with a powerful Kisan Sabha movement right in the ’30s.

It was at Champaran in Bihar that Gandhi began his experiments with the peasantry, gradually evolving the strategy of mobilising the peasants in a peaceful, non-violent Satyagraha against British rule, while discouraging any movement against the ‘swadeshi’ zamindars. The peasants of Bihar did respond zealously to every call of the freedom struggle coming from the Congress leadership, but in each and every case they translated the restricted Congress call into an active, often violent, movement against the zamindars. The zamindars being the main social prop of British rule in India, the peasants naturally interpreted these calls in the language they understood. This objective contradiction of real life forced the interim Congress ministry of Bihar, which assumed office in the wake of the 1937 elections, to negotiate a written agreement with the zamindars, an event unparalleled in India’s freedom movement. By contrast, the Kisan Sabha movement, having begun as a wing of the Congress, gradually detached itself from the Congress and came under the fold of the revolutionary democrats, a sizeable section later joining the Communist Party. History clearly shows that during the Kisan Sabha movement caste-based polarisations had all receded into the background. Also the anti-Brahminical movements or Ambedkar-type dalit movements or the harijan cause of Jagjivan Ram could never find much favour in Bihar during the entire phase of the freedom struggle even as the CPI and the Socialists successfully developed a strong base. If the CPI still retains a powerful base, it is more due to the legacy of the Kisan Sabha movement and certain positive achievements in the 50s during the period of Telangana.

In the post-independence period, to prevent the outbreak of Telangana-type struggles, once again Bihar was selected as the focal point for Vinoba Bhave’s Sarvodaya strategy. An erstwhile Socialist and an activist of the Kisan Sabha movement, Jai Prakash became the chief exponent of Sarvodaya in Bihar. But the agrarian reality of Bihar prevailed over their high-sounding rhetoric, and with Bhoodan ending in a big fiasco, Vinoba returned to Wardha and, JP too, temporarily retired from public life. The retreat of Vinoba and JP was followed by the advent of the political crisis of the mid-60s, and it was against this backdrop that Naxalbari immediately found its echo in the Musahari block of Muzaffarpur district in North Bihar. But soon the struggle there suffered a setback and once again JP jumped into the fray armed with his neo-Sarvodaya strategy, which later developed into his famous theory of ‘total revolution’.

While JP went ahead with his avowed aim of combating the ‘menace of Naxalism’, revolutionary communists, too, continued with their attempts to develop peasant struggles in different parts of Bihar, though with little success in the beginning. But just when things seemed to be going exactly the Bengal way by the end of 1971, quite unexpectedly the Central Bihar districts of Bhojpur, and to a lesser extent, Patna started sending encouraging signals. Rooted deep in the prevailing social conditions, the struggle in Bhojpur and Patna began on a different note and there emerged a non-traditional indigenous core of leadership.

All the precious blood of our heroic martyrs spilt over the fields and factories, hamlets and lanes, torture chambers and prison cells all over the country seemed to rise high in the sky, and there appeared a red glow over Bhojpur. And, as subsequent years have proved, the glow was not that of a meteor, but that of a star, a red star that has come here to stay and shine.

The independent course of the peasant struggle and the Party’s attempt to impart consciousness to it went through a peculiar phase of unity and struggle. The Party worked hard to develop communist elements from among the peasant vanguards, always trying to check the spontaneous negative tendencies of the movement and give it an organised shape. There were, however, also strong attempts on the part of the Party to super-impose its set of dogmatic ideas regarding forms of struggle and organisation on the movement and, to be sure, these attempts proved counter-productive.

Finally, the Party-wide rectification movement in the changed political situation of the post-Emergency period helped to restore the balance and provided new momentum to the fledgling peasant struggle, and we arrived at the present phase of a widespread peasant awakening. Paradoxically, the victim of this entire development was S N. Singh[4], who hailed from Bihar, and, that too from Bhojpur itself. The ghost of Charu Mazumdar chased him away from Bihar and in communist revolutionary circles in the state, he became the most discredited person.

Incidentally, the ‘credit’ for the first, and so far, the only fundamental division in the CPI(ML) goes to none other than the Bihar State Committee under the leadership of S.N. Singh. All other divisions are either artificial, temporary or of no great significance. Attempts have been made and are still being made to formulate a comprehensive ‘left’ line by certain groups, but no one can claim, as yet, to have developed such a line. Semi-anarchism is still at best a tendency debating over forms and methods of struggle and organisation, and a major section of those presently obsessed with this tendency will surely come back to the Marxist-Leninist fold as they gain more experience with the passage of time. In contrast, SN’s was a definite alternative tactical line advocating well-defined relations with well-defined social forces. That is why he was resurrected again and again and continues to assert even after his death at one pole of our movement. His essential difference with Charu Mazumdar began on the question of the relation with rich peasants. He emphasised unity with the rich peasants in contrast to CM’s emphasis on neutralising them through struggle. Subsequently, this line developed into that of unity with sections of the class of landlords and with the bourgeois opposition. (Bhaskar Nandy temporarily outwitted SN by theorising this unity on the basis of a totally different premise. However, SN soon withdrew himself from Nandy’s erroneous theoretical exercise.)

Later on, on the question of united front, SN and we both started from the same premise of developing a nationwide political alternative to the Congress rule. But the similarity ended here itself as SN chose to follow a totally different course, joining hands with JP, cultivating relations with the leaders of the Janata Party and a host of liberals, condemning the key role of agrarian revolution, end even going so far as to coin the now famous formulation that the proletariat may or may not lead the democratic revolution. True, under various pressures and compulsions, subsequently SN did have to compromise on many of his pronouncements, but these were more in the nature of tactics and did not affect his essential position.

We, on the other hand, stood for boldly expanding the peasant struggles which no doubt hit substantial sections of the rich peasants too who in Bihar do indulge in serious feudal practices. And precisely on the basis of these struggles did we work for developing the revolutionary bloc of the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie as an alternative to the Congress rule even as we left the door open for tactical manoeuvrings with the parties and factions of the bourgeois opposition.

It is in the context of this struggle between the two tactical lines that the peasant struggle in Bihar developed and expanded.

Emerging as it did in a different setting of the international communist movement the peasant struggle in Bihar did not get open support from the Chinese Communist Party, and in the face of sharp factional divisions, it even failed to receive a sympathetic hearing, let alone necessary support, from various communist revolutionary groups in India. Here was a situation that was really vastly different from what obtained during the struggles of Naxalbari and Srikakulam. However, the movement has indeed gained widespread solidarity from many quarters. In fact, it would have been impossible to sustain the movement for all these long years, had it not been for the valuable guidance provided by many veterans of the Indian communist movement and important leaders of the united CPI(ML), the help and cooperation received from the communist revolutionary ranks belonging to different groups and from Marxist academicians, revolutionary-democrats, civil liberty organisations, truth-seeking journalists, noted cultural personalities and progressive Indian circles abroad, and the support extended by the Communist Parties of China, Nepal, Philippines, Peru and other foreign friends.

The current struggle in Bihar is expanding in districts which have a fighting heritage dating back to the old Kisan Sabha days. These are the districts where the incidence of big landlordism is low, but where landlordism enjoys a wider base, encompassing not only the ex-intermediaries but also erstwhile powerful raiyats. Compared to many other parts of Bihar, agriculture in these districts is marked by a relatively greater use of modern means, better transport facilities and a more pronounced market-orientation of the rural economy. The various agrarian issues that have come to the fore in these districts are similar to those which affect the rural poor all over India, viz., minimum wages, tenancy rights, occupation of vested, benami, communal and government lands, prevention of distress sale of crops, easy availability of various inputs at cheaper rates and so on and so forth. In short, the region to a great extent is a typical representative of the changing pattern of Indian agriculture.

Indian agriculture today is also facing a new type of crisis caused by the saturation of the strategy of green revolution and ‘overproduction’. And as a direct outcome of this crisis, there has emerged a new type of farmers’ movement in certain parts of India. In Maharashtra, in particular, it has found a fertile field as well as a powerful exponent in Mr.Sharad Joshi. The theoretical framework propounded by Mr.Joshi focuses on the contradiction[5] between poor rural Bharat[6] and rich urban India, stresses economic upliftment of the peasants as the cure-all for all the ills being faced by the country today, and concentrates exclusively on the single-point-demand of remunerative prices for agricultural produce. He does not believe that any substantial ground exists for major conflicts among different sections of the rural population, and it goes without saying that the peasants of his conception are none other than the rich and middle farmers. As to why he is not laying any particular stress on the agricultural labourers, Mr.Joshi holds that, first, any economic gains achieved by the peasants will automatically percolate to the former by way of higher wages, and second, the lowest strata of the people have never played the vanguard role in history in bringing about social transformation.

Despite his agitational mode of operation, it is this emphasis on rural development coupled with his insistence on non-party politics and his persistent anti-communist bias that has endeared Mr.Joshi to the Sarvodayites, who are perhaps in search of a new messiah after the departure of both Vinoba and JP.

So, one now witnesses a battle for supremacy between the East and West winds within the peasant movement, blowing respectively from Bihar and Maharashtra. In sharp contrast to the farmers’ movement in Maharashtra, the peasant struggle in Bihar has in its forefront the agrarian labourers, who are quite numerous, as well as the poor and lower-middle peasants, while sizeable sections of the kulaks including, in certain pockets, elements from certain backward castes, find themselves on the other side of the fence, as a veritable target of attack, at least in the present phase of the movement. But even as the movement lays the highest stress on thoroughgoing land reforms, it does also strive to incorporate the issues arising out of the crisis of green revolution, issues that affect large segments of the middle and upper-middle peasants.

The outcome of this battle between the two winds has not yet been decided, and the final sequences of what may prove to be a most fascinating epic-drama in the history of India have not unfolded themselves either. Still, when the unceremonious death of the poorest among the peasants in the unknown, unheard of, dingy, mud-tracked, tiny country-town of Arwal[7] begins to shape the political crisis of the powers that be in Bihar, one can safely proclaim that the heroes have finally arrived on the stage.

Notes:
1. Setback in the first revolutionary upsurge following Naxalbari in the face of brutal repression.

2. This was the logic advanced by the CPI(M) General Secretary EMS Namboodiripad to explain its failure in Bihar.

3. See "On Contradictions – Antagonistic and Non-antagonistic" in the Social Scientist, September 1983

4. Quite interestingly, SN had at one time slandered the Bhojpur struggle as being guided and financed by Jagjivan Ram and later on, the dominant section of the PCC leadership also preferred to dismiss Bhojpur as a purely caste struggle. Late Comrade CP, during my [VM’s -- Ed.] talks with him, revealed how on persistent enquiries by the Chinese comrades about Bhojpur, Bhaskar Nandy had continued to repeat similar allegations. CP, however, differed with them and was even inclined to consider that annihilation, as practiced in Bhojpur, did have practical justification.

5. Interestingly, Mr.Joshi refers to Rosa Luxemburg in his support as against Lenin. He is also very much against Stalin’s tackling of the kulaks. However, his comments on Mao are not known.

6. To be fair to him, it must, however, be acknowledged that his rural Bharat does also include sections of the urban poor slumdwellers for instance, whom he considers as peasants driven away by poverty.

7. The infamous Arwal massacre of 1986 led to nationwide protests.

[Published serially in four parts in April, May, June and August issues of Liberation, in 1993.]

Sangh Parivar - Traitors to the cause of freedom

The role of the Communist Party in 1942 is a much maligned one and a few years back Mr.Arun Shourie searched through the archives to expose the socalled treachery of the CPI in that period, albeit with a few insertions of his own here and there. Admittedly, the Communist Party did make a tactical blunder in that period and almost all the communist formations of India accept that. Except this brief episode, communists remained an important segment of the freedom movement. Militant fighters for the cause of freedom were either inspired by the successful October Revolution in Soviet Union and the communist ideology or by leaders like Bhagat Singh and they graduated to communism in large numbers.

Savarkar, the first proponent of modern Hindutva, did play a heroic role in the early days of anti-British struggle. But since mid-20s, after becoming the leader of Hindu Mahasabha, he followed a clear line of compromise with the British, so much so that during the 1942 movement he asked the Mahasabha members in local bodies, legislatures and services to "stick to their posts and continue to perform their regular duties". The virulent anti-Muslim propaganda and the call to "Hinduize politics and militarize Hinduism" resorted to by Savarkar and his Mahasabha effectively meant full wartime collaboration with the British. (V.D. Savarkar, Historic Statements, 1957) Hedgewar, the founder of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, worked within the Congress fold but his espousal of Hindutva only led to his and his organisation’s growing drift from the mainstream freedom movement.

The non-cooperation movement of the early 1920s — which represented the highest point of anti-British unity in the entire history of freedom movement and which was betrayed by Gandhi and the Congress leadership, who called it off in l922 — only drew a derogatory remark from Hedgewar: "As a result of the non-cooperation movement of Mahatma Gandhi, the enthusiasm (for nationalism) in the country was cooling down and the evils in social life which that movement generated menacingly raised their head…The Yavan snakes reared on the milk of non-cooperation were provoking riots in the nation with their poisonous hissing". (Bhishikar, 1979, p.7)

In 1927, when the freedom movement showed fresh signs of revival and a powerful agitation developed against the arrival of the Simon Commission, the RSS kept itself strictly aloof and was rather busy organising its first training camp in Nagpur. September 1927 witnessed a communal riot in Nagpur and RSS was found deeply involved in the same.

In the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930, in the background of Congress adopting Purna Swaraj as the national goal in the Lahore Congress, once again the RSS was nowhere to be found. Hedgewar asked RSS shakhas to celebrate independence day -- 26 January 1930 as decided by the Congress -- through worship of the bhagwa jhanda (saffron flag). But in sharp contrast to the pattern prevailing generally all over the country, lathi-wielding RSS cadres were nowhere engaged in confrontation with the colonial police while observing the day.

Golwalkar took over as Sarsanghchalak after Hedgewar in 1940 and further perfected the anti-Muslim, pro-British thrust of Hinduism. Says Golwalkar, "The theories of territorial nationalism and of common danger, which formed the basis for our concept of nation, had deprived us of the positive and inspiring content of our real Hindu nationhood and made many of the freedom movements virtually anti-British movements. Being anti-British was equated with patriotism and nationalism. This reactionary view has had disastrous effects upon the entire course of the independence struggle, its leaders and the common people". (Golwalkar, 1966, pp. 142-43)

This, perhaps, is the most revealing exposition of the RSS’ definition of patriotism and nationalism. Strange as it may appear, this ideologue of Hinduism decries anti-British nationalism right amidst the rising tide of freedom movement to overthrow the colonial yoke. All the ‘nationalist, patriotic’ outcries and fervor of RSS were essentially directed against past memories of Muslim domination. For it, history had ceased to exist after Shivaji’s forays against the last great Moghul emperor, Aurangzeb. The British interlude only helped demolish the last remnants of Mughal rule and hence was an ally. Shivaji’s battle was to be continued till it culminated in Hindu Rashtra. The RSS emerged from Maharashtra with unmistakable Maratha overtones and it willingly played into the hands of British colonialists who always tried to sabotage the freedom movement by encouraging the Hindu-Muslim divide.

No wonder then that the RSS was nowhere to be found in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1940-41, the Quit India Movement of 1942, the Azad Hind Fauz, the 1945-46 upsurges centering around the INA trials and the Bombay naval mutiny.

Today, the same history continues in changed circumstances. Once again when the country is facing a serious threat of neo-colonialism from the same old imperialist powers, the Sangh Parivar is ready at the masters’ service. Their nationalism and patriotism has nothing to do with opposing American supremacy and the IMF-WB’s and MNCs’ domination over India. All their fervour is directed against the symbols of Muslim rule which have receded well past into history. This not only serves to sabotage India’s struggle for a second freedom from economic subjugation and chronic threats to political independence as well as from the authoritarian establishment for a people’s democratic society, but also serves their imperialist masters, with their newly perceived Islamic threat after the collapse of the communist challenge.

Philosophy of Hindu Rashtra is borrowed from Nazism

RSS-BJP propagandists day in and day out accuse communists of borrowing a foreign ideology from a German named Marx while they themselves claim to be purely indigenous. However, it was none but a German (albeit of Austrian origin) again who deeply influenced Golwalkar in fashioning his ideology and organisation. The name of this German is Adolf Hitler.

Writes Golwalkar in his We or Our Nationhood Defined: "German national pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep up the purity of the nation and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the semitic races -- the Jews. National pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well-nigh impossible it is for races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by."

Translation of this Nazism in India means that non-Hindu people must renounce every bit of their identity -- be it language, culture, religion…everything. In case they refuse to do so, Golwalkar may still allow them to stay in the country subject to the condition that they "wholly subordinate to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen’s rights".

The whole RSS philosophy of Hindu Rashtra, therefore, is nothing but a borrowed version of the German Nazi state.

BJP’s gameplan behind turning Ram, the mythical hero, into a national hero

The popular epics, Valmiki’s Ramayana and Tulsidas’ Ram Charit Manas symbolise the victory of good over evil in a typical fashion, elevating Ram, the popular mythical figure, to the rank of an incarnation of God. Thus Ram belongs to the spiritual and religious domain for Hindu masses. Integrity of his character, Maryada Purushottam, and the standards of his rule, the Ram Rajya, are often invoked in popular parlance to emphasize moral virtues and social justice. None has ever thought of turning Ram into a national hero till the advent of modern Hinduism.

Savarkar, the founding father of the ideology of Hindutva, in his desperate search for a symbol of Hindu India, wrote, "Some of us worship Ram as an incarnation, some admire him as a hero and a warrior, all love him as the most illustrious representative monarch of our race." Since then, advocates of Hindutva have been harping on the theme of this ‘most illustrious representative monarch of our race’. Vijaya Dashami was chosen as the day for launching of RSS in 1927. The saffron flag, supposed to be the flag of Ram, was chosen as the flag of RSS.

Finally, Babri Masjid, supposedly built after demolishing a Ram temple, provided the Sangh Parivar with the perfect mix where Ram was pitted against Babar. The transformation of Ram from a cultural, religious-mythical figure to a national hero with arrows targeted against Muslim ‘invaders’ was thus complete.

If, Ravana of Ram Katha imprisoned Sita, the Ravanas of Sangh Parivar have imprisoned Ram himself for their political manipulation. Ram has to be freed from their clutches to restore him to the spiritual-religious domain of his worshippers.

The RSS repeatedly exhorts Muslims to look upon Ram as their hero and assures them that all problems would then be over. But this demand is not only highly arrogant and ridiculous in that it asks Muslims to renounce their faith and revert to idol worship — because in no other way can Muslims look upon Ram as their hero — it is also a retrogressive demand, particularly when several Hindu trends have advanced towards monotheism, looking at God in abstraction.

While, in contrast to other mythical figures, the epic of a dispossessed Ram sharing his life with otherwise inferior castes and defeating Ravana, the Brahmin king, with their help evokes a popular identification with him among the common masses, his appeal is still not uniform even among Hindus of different sects and regions. Some segments of Hindus, particularly from among dalits, are even critical of some of his actions which they feel smack of an upper caste syndrome.

Hindus and Muslims quite rightly look upon the heroes of first independence war in 1857 as well as the martyrs of anti-British struggles as their national heroes. The demand should be made upon the Sangh Parivar to exhibit the same spirit because despite Golwalkar Indian nationalism had its origins only in anti-British struggles.

The myth of Hindu pride

One of the popular slogans of the Sangh Parivar is Garv se kaho hum Hindu hain (Proudly say we are Hindus), exhorting Hindus to proudly proclaim their Hindu identity. According to the Sangh ideologues, the loss of Hindu pride was mainly responsible for the Hindus’ meek submission to successive foreign invaders. Therefore in order to retrieve Hindu pride it is all the more necessary to demolish the monuments of Hindu humiliation. The Hindu crusade, at the fag end of the 20th century, has thus begun with the demolition of the Babri Masjid and obviously the list runs longer to include masjids at Kashi and Mathura to the Jama Masjid and even the Taj Mahal.

Let us recount the history of evolution of Hinduism to unearth the essence of this so-called Hindu pride. Ironically, the first known invaders of India were none other than the Aryans themselves, who came from the Iranian highlands around the middle of the second millennium B.C. To buttress its claim of Hindu India, the Sangh Parivar is engaged in a grand design of falsifying history and disproving all known historical tendencies in dishing out new theories of Aryans being the original inhabitants of this country. This is utterly false. The original inhabitants of India were people of the Mohenjodaro and Harappan civilisation in the Indus valley — a civilisation higher than that of the Aryans. India’s pre-Aryan population was most probably Dravidian. The Aryan tribes were semi-nomadic pastoral tribes with a developed patriarchal clan system and military democracy. In other words, they were at a transitional stage from a pre-class to class society. From the Indus basin and Northwest, they gradually spread out to the Gangetic basin and Northeast. This advance, however, involved innumerable battles with the local population. This whole transitional phase is reflected in the Rig Veda and other Vedas.

The religion of the Aryans at this stage is termed as Vedic religion. In the early stages, Devas and Asuras were both Vedic gods, albeit belonging to two hostile camps. Later on, Asuras became evil spirits, the opposite of what happened to other Iranians. The local hostile tribes of Dravidians were personified as Rakshasas.

Vedic Aryans practised polytheism where gods representing forces of nature, particularly Indra, occupied the central position. There were no temples, no professional priesthood, and no concept of retribution after death. The idea of the soul’s separation from the body too had not developed by then. A varna system had come into being reflecting the emerging pattern of social division of labour. In short, Vedic religion was reflective of the transitional stage of Aryan society and it was more concerned with life on earth than after-life.

As Aryan tribes evolved into settled agricultural communities, a number of despotic, early slave-owning kingdoms emerged in the beginning of the first millennium B.C. At this stage, Vedic religion gave way to what is known as Brahmanism.

The Varna structure acquired a social rigidity and there emerged a separate social group of Brahmans — specialists in the Vedas — with a good deal of authority. The laws of Manu, in 5th century B.C., gave divine sanction to the varna and caste system and the Brahman caste was virtually deified. Vedic gods were relegated to secondary positions and new deities came to the forefront, Brahma being the foremost among them. As the local population gradually merged with the Aryan conquerors, their deities too entered the Brahmanic pantheon. With the development of a rigid caste system, gods too became caste gods. With the arrival of Upanishads, the idea of immigration of soul became dominant and the idea of karma became the theoretical foundation of reincarnation.

The Brahmanical period is also described as the Upanishadic period where six classical schools of thought developed. Vedanta, advocating the merger of Atma with Bramha, a profoundly mystical philosophy, was the mainstay of Brahmans. The kshatriyas, who had been competing with the Brahmans, sided with Sankhya, a philosophy closer to materialism.

Beyond the sphere of classical philosophy, there emerged materialistic philosophies of Charvaka and Lokayata which rejected even the existence of god. They were reflective of the common people’s rejection of Brahmanic domination.

Brahmanism was collapsing under its own weight and the broad masses of people in the form of unconscious protest against oppressive caste system started rallying behind the rival religious trends of Buddhism and to an extent Jainism by 6th and 5th century B.C.

Both these trends rejected the caste system as well as the organised priesthood. Buddhism, in the main, replaced Brahmanism and between 3rd century B.C. and 1st and 2nd century A.D. it even became the state religion under Maurya and Kushan dynasties. With its complex rituals, alienated from the masses, the Brahminic aristocracy was no match for the Buddhists’ populism.

In the course of its struggle with Buddhism, Brahmanism drastically reshaped itself under the leadership of Adi Shankaracharya. Thus began the phase of what is known as Hinduism. The Buddhists were the first to introduce the concept of temples. To overwhelm the masses, grand Hindu temples were built with huge idols of gods. Pilgrimage sites were introduced, and to ensure mass mobilisation, public ceremonies and religious processions were initiated. To bring gods closer to the masses, there came into being the concept of Avatars. Mythical heroes like Ram and Krishna were elevated to the status of avatars of god and thus were treated as saviours. Buddha too was incorporated as one of Vishnu’s avatars. Strange enough, while Buddhism spread far and wide and became a world religion, in the country of its origin it was virtually wiped out.

Hinduism essentially came to mean the preservation of the old caste system supplemented by new methods of influencing and controlling the masses. With the growth of social stratification, caste, ethnic and racial diversification and complexities of class relations, Hindus went on splintering into various sects, marked by unending mutual schisms.

While futile attempts for sarva panth sambhav — later translated as sarva dharma sambhav and proclaimed as the basis of Indian secularism — were made by some, in later periods there emerged religious reform movements, first under the impact of Islam, and then Christianity. Kabir, Nanak, Chaitanya and a host of other reformers — making up what is known as the Bhakti Andolan in the Middle Ages — attacked the caste system and the complicated rituals of Hinduism. Kabir stands out as the most outstanding among all these reformers, who, on behalf of the common masses launched scathing attacks against the superstition and hypocrisy of the Brahmans.

In the British period, Raja Rammohan Roy, Dayanand Saraswati and Vivekanand were the major advocates of reform. They all championed the pantheistic philosophy of the Vedanta school and tried to get rid of the rigid caste system. However, each one of these trends ended up only adding another sect to Hinduism and nothing more. Hinduism, with its rigid caste system, supposedly with divine sanction, closed its doors forever and remained essentially a national religion. Buddhism, Christianity and then Islam grew into world religions. Vishwa Hindu Parishad therefore is a misnomer, a pretence, to project Hinduism as a world religion.

More than upholding a false Hindu pride, all progressive reform movements in Hinduism have tried to give Hinduism a liberal, modern outlook with particular emphasis on doing away with the rigidity of its caste structure. Hindu orthodoxy has all along resisted it more or less successfully on the strength of traditions and traditional institutions. Now for the first time, there has emerged a counter-movement under the auspices of the Sangh Parivar, which aims at annulling whatever effect the reforms have had. Those who are expecting a social reform in Hinduism out of the current upsurge of Hindutva are living in a fool’s paradise. This movement has so far offered us only wilful distortion of history, consolidation of the social and political clout of the sadhus and mahants, renewed aggressiveness of upper caste Hindus and of course a lumpen army of Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sainiks. This is what is being hailed by the ideologues of the Sangh Parivar as the upsurge of Hindutva, the rise of a Kshatriya cult in Hinduism on the lines of Khalsa, and, of course, as the assertion of Hindu pride.

Religion, as has been rightly said, is the expression of man’s powerlessness vis-a-vis his environment. Religious fantasies do provide illusions of breaking through the limits imposed by the environment and people, therefore, have always flocked to religion, particularly in times of distress. But illusions are only illusions, they can never replace reality. Invoking the Hindu pride and the super-human role of a monkey god, it is possible to demolish a dilapidated structure, kill and maim thousands of unarmed innocent people but not to resist the invasion of neo-colonial powers which is going on unabated, ironically with the complicity of the forces of Hindu pride.

The myth of ‘secular’ Hinduism

Another oft-repeated argument of the Sangh Parivar is that India is secular because Hindus constitute the overwhelming majority of the Indian population. Incidentally, this idea of equating the supposedly inherent tolerance of Hinduism with secularism also informs the official ‘secular’ opinion in India and hence the Hindu ethos is constantly invoked in all preachings of secularism in India.

Now, the present rise of Hindutva is marked by an alarming escalation of religious fanaticism in the Hindu masses, the growing clout of sadhus and mahants in the nation’s political life, a dangerous consolidation of all the dregs and scum of society in outfits like Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena, a heightened spate of anti-Muslim pogroms, the open exhibition of communal bias by various wings of the state and increasing intolerance of every kind of dissenting idea in the academic world. This convincingly shows that a pure Hindu state can only mean the negation of democracy and secularism.

Secondly, several developed countries, where Christianity and Buddhism are dominant religions, are far more secular than India. Christianity in particular was quite an orthodox and intolerant religion — if one remembers the Inquisition — and in many European countries the church was a very powerful institution. In course of time, however, various trends emerged within Christianity and successful bourgeois revolutions led to the separation of the church from the state. In fact, the very concept of secularism, based on separation of religion and the state, arose from the successful bourgeois revolutions of the West.

Proponents of the supposedly inherent secular character of Hinduism, however, contrast it only with the supposedly inherent intolerance of Islam. This perception of Islam is shared by a vast majority of Hindu masses and therefore it is necessary to delve deep into the evolution of Islam.

In the sixth century, various tribes inhabiting Arabia were engaged in internecine clashes. The decline of the caravan trade and the consequent need for land was the major factor behind this. Islam as the movement for unification among warring tribes arose out of this socio-economic condition. Muhammad’s preaching advocating the merger of tribal cults and submission to the single supreme god — Allah — began in this historical situation. Chiefs of his own Koerish tribe as well as the merchant nobility were initially hostile to his ideas and he had to flee Mecca. People in the agricultural oasis of Medina, who were in conflict with the Mecca aristocracy provided a strong support base to Muhammad and with their help he eventually seized Mecca. With the emergence of Mecca as an important religious and national centre the Koerish nobility too not only accepted Islam, but even became its leaders.

Engels wrote that Islam was a religion intended, on the one hand, for city-dwellers engaged in commerce and craft and, on the other hand, for nomadic Bedouins.

Islam which had emerged as a national religion for Arabs soon turned into a world religion. By eighth and ninth century, Islam became the exclusive religion in the vast territory from Spain to Central Asia stretching to the borders of India. In the latter centuries, it spread on a larger scale to Northern India. Still later, it expanded to Indonesia, Caucasia and among certain peoples in the Balkan states.

Conquests recorded as holy wars for faith (Jihad) and arising out of the Arab need to unify and seize new lands did play a major role in the spread of Islam. But if people in many states like Byzantine and Sissamid empires did not offer any resistance, the reason being the terrible oppression suffered by them at the hands of local feudal lords. In the countries conquered by the Arabs, the obligations of the peasant populations — particularly those adopting Islam — was lessened considerably. In India the spread of Islam was facilitated by inhuman Brahminical caste oppression. The spread of Islam also has much to do with its simplicity, which made it attractive for the peasant masses in the patriarchal feudal states of the East.

Subsequently, the Muslim theologians and secular scholars have reinterpreted the commandments of Jihad. There have been attempts to reinterpret Hinduism as the religion with a holy book and Ram and Krishna as prophets of their times. Readers may recall in this context a recent debate in Muslim theological circles in Bihar where a certain Muslim scholar gave a call to withdraw the label of Kafirs on Hindus.

Islam has codified civil and criminal laws based on religious laws known as Shariat. Patriarchal tribal attitudes did influence the family ethics in Islam where women are subordinate to men. This is perhaps common to all religions. However, in the concrete social conditions prevailing in Arabia then, the Koran by condemning the cruel conduct of a husband towards his wife — and by specifying the woman’s property rights — the right to dowry and inheritance — did elevate the status of women somewhat.

Though Islam united people on a large scale under the banner of religion, the national and class contradictions went on intensifying in Muslim countries. This was reflected through the emergence of various trends and sects in Islam.

One of the earliest and largest among such trends has been Shiaism. It began as an internal struggle among the Arabs, as a struggle for power between Muhammad’s successors, but soon it developed into an expression of discontent of the Persians against their Arab conquerors. Shiaism till date remains the state religion of Iran. Most of the Muslims of the world, however, follow Sunnism. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Mutzilites — a sect among Sunnis — tried to interpret the Muslim doctrine in a rational spirit, maintaining that the Koran was a book written by the people and not created by god, and that man has free will. As against schools of thought based on literal interpretation of religions dogmas, certain schools of thought arose within Islam, which allowed for a more liberal interpretation of the doctrine and enjoyed support in more developed regions of the Muslim world.

Sufism grew within Shiaism but was also adopted among Sunnis. Adherents of Sufism did not pay much attention to superficial rituals and sought a mystical union with the divine. In the strict sense, they deviated from the Koran in their pantheistc perception of god. Initially they were persecuted by orthodox Muslims but later on a compromise was brought about.

In keeping with the era of democratic revolutions and anti-imperialist movements, radical changes occurred in Muslim traditions during the 19th and 20th centuries. In a number of Muslim countries the sphere of influence of the Shariat has been limited, legal norms have been secularised and the state separated from the hold of the Muslim clergy. In Turkey, in 1920s, democratic revolution occurred under the leadership of Kemal Pasha and after the establishment of republic radical reforms were introduced.

India provides a classical case of Islam’s coexistence with Hinduism, a religion with idol worship and many gods, for centuries. At the level of religious beliefs, there could hardly be any meeting point between the two, but at the grassroots, people from both religions share a common life, common aspirations, and many common beliefs. As the country was divided on Hindu-Muslim lines, obviously Muslims who remained in India would have a sympathetic attitudes towards Pakistan quite similar to the attitude of a Pakistani or Bangladeshi Hindu towards India. However, after Partition, the politics of Indian Muslims has generally veered around the Congress. To preserve its vote bank, the Congress went into political and social deals with Muslim fundamentalist forces often to offset the concessions it made to Hindu fundamentalism. This game had its obvious limits, and recent events have caused disillusionment of the Muslim community in relation to the Congress. Parties like Janata Dal have now jumped in to cash in on the Congress’ predicament, aligning, however, with the same fundamentalist forces.

The BJP’s advocacy of a Hindu state and its religious fanaticism is only, albeit negatively, strengthening fundamentalist forces among Muslims. Opposing bigamy or polygamy as part of progressive social reforms is one thing, but linking it with the growth of Muslim population is highly absurd. Having more children is an attribute of the feudal society and has nothing to do with religion. Polygamy is practised by a miniscule section of Muslims in India, and moreover, a little common sense can explain that given the ratio of male and female population, neither can this be the general phenomenon in a society, nor can it in any way account for population growth. The BJP’s concern for a uniform civil code and the rights of Muslim women is a big fraud and is only part of an overall attack on Muslim identity. Its jumping into the fray in the Shah Bano case only led to an orthodox Muslim backlash and caused a setback to a progressive social reform which otherwise had good support among Muslims too.

By advocating second-grade citizenship for Muslims in Hindu India, the BJP is only strengthening pro-Pakistan feelings among Muslims. Similarly, the demand for merging the Muslim identity with the Hindu ‘cultural’ identity is a direct negation of a composite Indian identity, notwithstanding the BJP’s trickery of equating Hindu identity with Indian identity. The Sangh Parivar’s ideological offensive shall only perpetuate and strengthen the myth of Pakistan among Indian Muslims.

Pakistan and the Pakistani myth among Indian Muslims was created because of the pronounced Hindu bias of India’s freedom struggle. And it continues to exist and draw fresh sustenance from the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva hysteria. True to their treacherous role in freedom struggle, they are repeating the same for the sake of splitting and weakening the Indian people’s resistance to the neo-colonial danger. The Sangh Parivar is once again at His Master’s Service, exactly when it is needed most.

However, the BJP is not going to have the last word on the future of Indian Muslims. New generations of Muslim youth no longer have any deep emotional attachment with Pakistan and are eager to carve out their space in India as Indian Muslims. They are quite receptive to the ideas of a secular state and recent events have brought them closer to the Left. Progressive and democratic intelligentsia among Muslims are raising their voice for democratic reforms within the Muslim society, stressing modern education and, particularly, elevation of the status of women. All secular forces must strengthen this developing current among Indian Muslims, which will lead to their becoming equal partners in deciding the destiny of India. Only a genuinely secular Indian state will destroy the very rationale of Pakistan, and if Pakistan still exists, be sure that the Indian Muslim youth will celebrate India’s victory over Pakistan in a cricket match with the same fervour as his Hindu brother.

In lieu of conclusion

In the month of March, a comrade handed me a questionnaire issued by the ABVP during the Benares Hindu University Students’ Union elections, with the request to write a ‘befitting’ reply. The questions were a mere rehash of oft-repeated allegations against communists, their foreign roots, their role in the Quit India movement, during partition and even during Emergency and so on and so forth. ABVP wondered what relevance Marxism had in India after the Soviet collapse. Wonder of wonders! ABVP was soon to get a befitting reply in Benares Hindu University itself!

The battle in BHU campus had clearly assumed ideological proportions and ABVP had to suffer a stunning defeat at the hands of AISA. The victory was an exclusive AISA victory as the student wings of CPI and CPI(M), Janata Dal, Mulayam, and even ex-Naxalites, were all working to ensure AISA’s defeat. The BHU victory came in succession to AISA victories in Nainital and Allahabad and attracted a lot of media attention.

Ideologues of the Sangh Parivar, who till the other day relished the ‘death’ of Marxism and boasted their expanding influence in West Bengal and Kerala as the corroboration of this fact were hard put to explain the resurgence of Marxism in the intellectual centres of Uttar Pradesh. Time was ripe for going over to a counter-offensive and thus the idea of this popular series was born.

Unfortunately, most of the writings against the Sangh Parivar’s communal philosophy were enmeshed in a liberal Hindu framework: extolling the virtues of Ram, invoking the themes of Hindu tolerance and Sarva Dharma Sambhav, and correspondingly, the liberal Hindu image of Gandhi and Vivekanand; and appealing to the conscience of communalists formed the mainstream of secular defence. Left leaders too joined in under the pretext of a new-found realisation of the role of religion. Even Nehru — so dear to CPI and CPI(M)-wallahs — became taboo and was silently replaced by Gandhi in secular left literature. Pseudo-secularism indeed!

True, the fascist connotation of Hindu Rashtra was as correctly identified as the need to build a broader unity of secular forces. But in the absence of a renewed thrust on the consolidation of a left core, this opened the floodgates of ideological and political opportunism as well. It goes without saying, that bereft of the cutting edge a counter-offensive, the whole secular propaganda may fall flat in face of a heightened communal onslaught. Who will then take up this challenge? The responsibility invariably falls on the Marxist-Leninists.

In course of our popular propaganda against communalism we questioned:

(A) The Gandhian methodology of invoking Hindu symbols, particularly Ram Rajya in the freedom struggle and held that it was the prime cause for Muslim alienation.

(B) Radhakrishnan’s definition of secularism as sarva dharma sambhava — which also became the official credo — and held that a modem state’s policy towards religion can only be sarva dharma varjite.

(C) The rationality of projecting Ram, a religious figure, as a national hero, and held that this status can only be attributed to the people’s hero Bhagat Singh.

(D) The validity of Hindu Rashtra as the unifying force for the country, and held that, if history is any guide, a Hindu Rashtra will surely disintegrate into multitudes of kingdoms. Symptoms of Maratha Rashtra of Shiv Sena developing side by side is an indicator of this.

(E) The role of the RSS in the entire course of the freedom struggle, including in 1942, in precipitating and supporting partition with the demand that entire Muslim population should be deported to Pakistan, in hobnobbing with Indira Congress during the days of Emergency, and held that RSS openly derived inspiration from Nazism, a foreign ideology.

(F) The RSS style of diffusing the target against the colonial masters during the freedom struggle by raising the Muslim bogey, and held that history was being repeated once again exactly when India was facing the serious threat of neo-colonisation.

(G) The anti-Pakistan axis of Indian foreign policy and held that a friendly approach towards Pakistan and a positive resolution of the bilateral dispute of Jammu and Kashmir are crucial to the improvement of the communal situation in India. We even proposed a commonwealth of independent states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In our build up of a counter-offensive we had pointed out that the most conservative bourgeois and landlord class and upper caste social composition of BJP, the increasing intervention of sadhus and mahants in civic and political life, the militant organisation of dregs of society in the garb of kar sevaks and hordes of upstart intellectuals bent upon falsifying history, organising hate mail and forcibly shutting down all dissident voices in academic circles combine to form a perfect mix for fascism.

Afterthought

The Babri Masjid has been demolished. Democrats of all hues have rightly demanded that for the sake of historic justice the Babri Masjid should be rebuilt there itself. The doubt, however, lingers on whether this will be possible or practical at this stage.

A makeshift Ram temple is already there and the way the Rao government is proceeding – in the typical Congress style of ‘delinking religion from politics’— and acting from behind only through Chandraswami and Shankaracharyas, the case of a Ram temple is getting strengthened. Who will take the credit — Congress or BJP — remains the only issue to be settled.

Ideologues of the Sangh Parivar had been repeatedly saying that Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi dispute is not merely a religious one. As Babri Masjid, according to them, was the symbol of national humiliation, of Muslim invasion and rule over Hindu India, it is instead a question of national dignity.

Come on, for the sake of nationalism and patriotism why not build a national monument at the site? Neither the Babri Masjid, nor a Ram Mandir, a national monument in memory of the heroes of the first war of independence of 1857. After all, Awadh was the epicentre of this rebellion and building a national monument at Ayodhya can be a befitting honour to that history.

If Hinduism is just not a religion but a culture embracing all those who live in India, if Hinduism is equivalent to Indianness and if the Babri Masjid was demolished because it was a symbol of national humiliation, the Sangh Parivar should have no objection to raising a monument of national honour. Let the super nationalists and super patriots of Sangh Parivar accept this proposal and see how Muslims — the ‘anti-nationals’ — react to it. Messers Malkani and Govindacharya, are you listening to me?

Well, whether they listen or not, it is high time the secular and patriotic forces mooted this proposal, so as to prevent the building of a Ram Mandir there. A Ram Mandir will be a perpetual source of humiliation and alienation to Indian Muslims, and in this sense, a symbol of national disintegration. A national monument seems to be the only principled and practical demand at this stage and the nation must act, if necessary over the heads of all hues of die-hards, to avert a national catastrophe.

[From the Political-Organisational Report adopted at the Fifth Party Congress.]

In the last few years India’s communal temperature has been rising unabated, and with the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the subsequent nationwide trauma that left over a thousand dead and many more injured, communalism has come to the top of the political agenda. A multitude of factors, viz., the collapse of the Nehruvian economic model, growing public disgust with the political systems, real and imaginary threats to national unity and the international environment of rightist and fundamentalist resurgence, have contributed to an atmosphere conducive to the upswing of communal ideology and politics. And the political opportunism practiced by the mainstream political parties — Congress(I), Janata Dal, CPI and CPI(M) all included — at one or other junctures in relation to the BJP has further fueled the latter’s growth.

It must be clearly understood that the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute is not a simple Mandir-Masjid dispute between Hindus and Muslims. The shrewd leadership of RSS and BJP has persistently projected the Babri Masjid as a monument of Muslim invasion of Hindu India, which deserves to be demolished to restore the Hindu glory. Ram Janambhoomi thus became a very specific symbol for the long-term RSS philosophy of a Hindu Rashtra, attracted a large audience from gullible Hindu masses and assumed the character of a veritable mass movement skillfully organised by the Sangh Parivar. Behind the facade of religion what really mattered was politics and ideology. The name of Ram carried the BJP to every nook and corner of the country and helped it become the main opposition party within a short span of time. And with the BJP in power in four states, the RSS immediately began to tamper with school syllabi to convert schools into centers for disseminating the ideology of Hindu Rashtra.

The BJP has thus boldly moved to fill the ideological-political vacuum created by the retreat of Marxist and various other socialist ideals, as well as the disgrace suffered by the Congress(l), to emerge as a communal fascist alternative.

Fascism, the representative ideology of the most Conservative section of the bourgeoisie and landlords, is by its very nature, aggressive. BJP is not a party which can rest content with power in one or two states. It is desperate to take the next leap to power at the Centre. It has therefore kept up the pressure on the issue of Ayodhya, organised demolition of the Babri Masjid and is now issuing fresh threats to overrun Muslim shrines at Kashi and Mathura.

The official response to this communal offensive has remained confined to invoking the liberal Hindu plank and having recourse to legal channels. The mainstream Left response too has never been able to cross this borderline and it finally culminated in the slogan Mandir bane, Masjid rahe — sab kanun ka palan kare. Had Marx been alive he would have commented that India is a country where all battles, whether among classes or concepts, end up in compromises. So also with secularism.

A lot of people are taken in by the other variant of BJP propaganda which that India is secular because Hindus form the majority. Implicit here is the suggestion that Hindu religion is tolerant and liberal in contrast to the fundamentalism supposedly inherent in Islam.

First of all, the turn of events at Ayodhya has convincingly exploded this myth. Once Hinduism assumed an organised character a la Vishwa Hindu Parishad with Ayodhya as the so-called Hindu Vatican, the mahants of Hindu religion came out as perfect zealots and fanatics like fundamentalists of any other religion.

Secondly, secularism has nothing to do with the so-called positive assimilation of all religions or sarva dharma sambhav — a connotation attributed to it by modern social thinkers of India under the pretext of Indianising secularism. Secularism essentially means the rejection of religion in organising the affairs of the state.

Thirdly, a secular state everywhere has been the product of a successful democratic revolution and the very compulsion of diluting the concept of secularism in India is nothing but another confession of the unfinished character of the Indian democratic revolution. The orthodox or liberal face of any religion assuming predominance is related to the stage of evolution of a civil society. Christianity passing from the stage of orthodoxy to liberalism or the supposedly inherently liberal Sikhism turning orthodox with the rise of Khalistan etc. are all examples of this social law.

Liberal Hindu intellectuals are shocked by the demolition of the Babri Masjid as it supposedly goes against Hindu tenets. At the same time, they wonder why the Muslim leaders do not give up their claim to this dilapidated structure, which anyway, was not a functional mosque. They conveniently forget that for the Muslims, too, the Babri Masjid had become a monument symbolising their identity and existence in the complex socio-historical conditions of India.

The alienation of the Indian secular intellectual from the man on the street and his consequent panic in the face of communal offensive has often led him to bank on the negativist strategy of pitting Mandal against Mandir. The strategy met with abject failure in the last elections.

There can be no denying the fact that to mobilise broad public opinion against today’s communal offensive, liberal values of both Hinduism and Islam as well as archaeological findings and legal verdicts should all be put to good use. However, wide propaganda of modern secular ideals from an independent left platform alone can provide the essential core of a counter-offensive. Moreover, the question of secularism should not be posed in contrast to the tasks of democratic revolution or to justify all sorts of opportunist political alliances in the name of a secular front. Rather it should be made part and parcel of the democratic revolution. Instead of having a secular front which may also take up democratic questions we must have a democratic front which has the formation of a secular state on top of its agenda, not just as an ethical question or as an affirmation of historical traditions, but as a question of practical politics, as an absolute pre-condition for building a modern India.